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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
 
 The goals of this report are to assess the quality and usability of available 
statistics on China’s manufacturing employment and labor compensation for the most 
recent available year and for the period since 1990 and, if possible, to estimate annual, 
monthly, and hourly labor compensation for PRC manufacturing employees.  The report 
shows that China has released just enough relevant data on annual average wages and 
labor-related employer expenditures to derive 2002 estimates of annual labor 
compensation for 30 million city manufacturing employees and 71 million non-city 
manufacturing employees, that is, those working in village and town enterprises.  
Combining the published and adjusted labor compensation figures for these two groups 
results in an approximation of average PRC 2002 labor compensation per manufacturing 
employee.  Because China has not systematically collected and reported adequate data on 
actual hours worked by manufacturing employees in 2002, or for any full year, this report 
uses published partial information and a set of hypotheses to estimate annual hours 
worked by city and non-city manufacturing employees, thus calculating rough 
approximations of average 2002 hourly labor compensation in manufacturing for these 
two categories of manufacturing employees and for China as a whole.  Labor 
compensation estimates are converted into U.S. dollars at the commercial exchange rate, 
and also estimated in international purchasing power parity (PPP) dollars to give a sense 
of the real purchasing power of the compensation of PRC manufacturing employees in 
their own domestic economy. 
 
 Much of this report is focused on discussing issues of data quality and serious 
problems of incompleteness of the available data and excessive focus of published 
statistics on city manufacturing employees to the near-exclusion of data on the more 
numerous manufacturing employees working outside the administrative boundaries of 
cities.  Even within the cities, China’s Ministry of Labour and Social Security and the 
National Bureau of Statistics focus their data collection and reporting on the rapidly 
declining state-owned and urban collective-owned manufacturing enterprises, while not 
yet adequately expanding their efforts to collect statistics on the thriving, growing, 
dynamic private manufacturing sector.  Outside city boundaries, where most of China’s 
manufacturing employees are working, collection and reporting of statistics seems to be 
the job of the Ministry of Agriculture and its sub-unit on village and town enterprises 
(TVEs).  This division of statistical responsibility is a holdover from the command 
economy of the pre-1978 period.  It results in the near-absence of reported statistics on 
the numbers and labor compensation of manufacturing workers in China’s industrial 
parks, suburbs, towns, rural areas, and any other concentrations of manufacturing 
enterprises and suppliers that are located outside city boundaries. 
 
 Data on manufacturing employees and their wages in China come from regular 
administrative reporting systems that are supposed to cover all employees, rather than 
from labor surveys as in most developed countries.  This report compares these 
administrative figures with other sources of data on manufacturing employee numbers 
and the urban-rural distribution of manufacturing workers, including the 1995 industrial 
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census of China and especially the population census of November 1, 2000.  The 2000 
census gives the occupational breakdown of PRC manufacturing workers and the 
distribution of manufacturing workers by number of days worked in the week before the 
census, which are reported and discussed here. 
 
The author also assesses the probable biases in PRC statistics on numbers of 
manufacturing workers and their wages.  The report argues that city manufacturing 
enterprises in particular have powerful incentives to underreport the number of their 
manufacturing employees and especially the compensation of any employees whose work 
is reported.  The main purposes of the underreporting of employee numbers, wages, and 
total labor compensation are avoidance of taxes and minimization of required employer 
payments to social insurance and employee housing funds administered by urban 
authorities. 
 
 This report demonstrates that manufacturing employment in China increased 
during the 1980s and early 1990s, peaked in about 1995-1996, declined during the late 
1990s until 2000-2001, and increased again in 2002.  The genuine declines in PRC 
manufacturing employment in the late 1990s were caused by restructuring and 
privatization of state-owned and urban collective-owned factories in the cities, which 
brought about massive layoffs of urban manufacturing workers and sharp increases in 
manufacturing labor productivity.  Private sector manufacturing has thrived in both urban 
and rural areas in the late 1990s and the early 21st century.  These factories are more 
productive than state-owned and collective-owned factories and are competitive in the 
domestic and global economies.  The renewed increase in PRC manufacturing 
employment that began in 2002 or before is fueled by private corporations and 
businesses, both foreign-funded and domestically-owned. 
 
 As demonstrated in this paper, the numbers published in the global and U.S. 
popular media on the low compensation of China’s manufacturing workers are in the 
ballpark of reasonable estimates.  The author discusses factors that make China especially 
competitive in manufacturing for the global market, and some factors that are reducing 
and hampering China’s competitiveness.  The PRC is indeed an extremely low-wage 
manufacturing environment, and China also benefits from other advantages that give this 
country a competitive edge over many other possible manufacturing locations around the 
world, including low land prices, big concentrations of low-cost parts suppliers, a 
relatively stable and safe political situation, tax and regulatory policies that promote 
foreign direct investment in PRC manufacturing, and China’s own huge potential and 
actual domestic market for manufactured goods. 
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Introduction 
 
 The United States Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) publishes estimates of hourly 
compensation in manufacturing for many countries on its web site.  Most of the countries 
are developed countries with reasonably good quality data.  Some developing countries 
are also included.  BLS would like to expand this list and the supporting analysis to 
include more countries, among them the People’s Republic of China (PRC, or China) if 
possible.  Standards are high for the quality of statistics to be included in the BLS web 
site on hourly compensation for manufacturing workers in different countries.  PRC data 
do not yet meet these standards; this project assesses the quality and completeness of 
those China data that are available. 
 
 China’s statistical system has been greatly strengthened during the most recent 
quarter century of economic reform (see also Taylor & Banister, 1989).  PRC statisticians 
are steadily trying to learn from international practice as promoted by the World Bank, 
Asian Development Bank, International Monetary Fund, and the United Nations system.  
They endeavor to apply best practices from other countries, especially developed 
countries, to the Chinese economy.  These improvements have been particularly 
successful in China’s population censuses and some economic and demographic surveys, 
especially the annual urban and rural household income and consumption surveys.  
Nevertheless, China’s statistical system is still affected by categories and procedures that 
were established during the command economy period before 1978 and never revised.  
Those outdated categories hamper analysis of levels and trends of economic growth, 
inflation or deflation, employment, wages, and economic change in the urban and rural 
economies.  In addition, despite expanding its use of censuses and representative sample 
surveys, China continues to employ the method of regular (usually annual) statistical 
reporting by all production or administrative units as its primary data collection 
technique. 
 
 Most PRC statistics are recorded and collected under the central guidance of the 
National Bureau of Statistics (NBS).  However, as this report amply shows, other 
ministries have certain statistical turf that is their particular responsibility for historical or 
bureaucratic reasons, and there seems to be little coordination among the relevant 
ministries.  For instance, with regard to manufacturing employment and wage statistics, 
the Ministry of Labour and Social Security (also referred to in this report as “Labour 
Ministry”) gathers statistics on most components of the city economies, leaving a small 
but growing segment to the State Administration for Industry and Commerce (SAIC).  
However, collection and reporting of statistics on manufacturing in rural areas and in 
towns is left to a part of the Ministry of Agriculture (see Glossary and Definitions at the 
end of this report for a list of the ministries involved in the collection and reporting of 
manufacturing employment and labor compensation in China). 
 
Certain biases also affect China’s statistics.  For example, the PRC government 
emphasizes the collecting and reporting of statistics on the steeply declining public sector 
while seriously neglecting the rapidly growing and dynamic private sector, in part 
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because the dominance of private and corporate businesses does not fit easily into Maoist 
theory or Mao Zedong thought.  
 
 This report analyzes employment, wage, and labor compensation statistics for 
China in the manufacturing sector.1  Published data are included for the economic reform 
period that began in 1978, but the report emphasizes the period from 1990 to the present, 
particularly the most recent year for which manufacturing employment and compensation 
statistics have been released, which is 2002. 
 
 This analysis is based as much as possible on information in Chinese sources 
published by PRC official statistical organizations.  The most useful sources turn out to 
be statistical yearbooks from various government ministries.  BLS hopes to be able to 
replicate the calculation process used here for 2002 to estimate PRC hourly 
manufacturing labor compensation for 2003 and future years.  The research effort behind 
this report has searched out the few usable statistics that are hidden in a vast sea of 
published numbers and tangential qualitative reports, thus guiding those who desire to 
make China manufacturing labor compensation estimates for years after 2002.    
 
 The author compiles and compares data on PRC manufacturing employment from 
the 1995 industrial census, the 2000 population census, and administrative data collected 
from manufacturing enterprises and reported annually.  This report explains discrepancies 
among the data sets, to the extent possible, and discusses the effects of definitional 
changes on the available series of manufacturing employment statistics.  Strengths and 
weaknesses in the published statistics are highlighted.  Then focusing on 2002, the author 
tabulates all information she has located on wages, required social benefit payments, and 
other labor compensation, deriving annual, monthly, and estimated hourly manufacturing 
labor compensation for urban, village and town enterprise (TVE), and all-China 
manufacturing employees in the Chinese currency, the yuan or renminbi.  These 
estimates are calculated in US dollars at the official exchange rate, and also in 
international dollars using purchasing power parity (PPP) exchange rates (see Glossary 
and Definitions: Currency; PPP; TVEs; Urban and rural”). 
 
Recent Employment Statistics for China 
 
 Employment figures for China are usually confusing and non-standard.  They 
reflect, in part, conventions from the Maoist command economy period 1949-1978 as 
well as new conventions for the semi-market economy of the economic reform period 
since 1978.  The available data also reflect China’s attempts to make its economic 
statistics more internationally comparable.  Recent employment statistics are pieced 
together primarily from two sources: 
 
1. Annual enterprise data:  Each enterprise, economic unit, small business, or self-
employed individual or group is supposed to report employment and wage data 
each year according to its “labor situation” in the previous year and at the 
                                                 
1 The analysis in this report refers to the Mainland of the People’s Republic of China and excludes statistics 
from Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan.  
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previous yearend, which are then compiled upward in a statistical reporting chain 
to the national government. 
 
2. Census data:  The 1990 and 2000 censuses of China asked respondents 
information about employment of all persons age 15 and older.  In the 2000 
census, the data were gathered in a long form filled out by about 10 percent of 
civilian households chosen to be representative of the population as a whole. 
 
A. China Census and Enterprise Employment Data Discrepancies 
 
These two sets of employment data for the PRC do not entirely agree with each 
other.  For example, Table 1 shows the estimated numbers of employees in each major 
sector of China’s economy at or near the end of the year 2000 from the two major data 
sources.  The census, on November 1, 2000, recorded a total PRC employed population 
of approximately 709.7 million workers (based on the long form filled out by a sample of 
about 10 percent of households in every locality, then extrapolated by this author to the 
whole counted civilian population age 15 and above2).  Two months later, administrative 
compilations of data from enterprises, economic units, and self-employed individuals 
recorded a total of 629.8 million workers, 80 million fewer than the census (Table 1). 
 
    What are the sources of the discrepancies between these two sets of data?  We can 
see from Table 1 that the census recorded 123 million more workers in agriculture than 
did annual administrative data.  One reason for this huge difference is that the census 
asked about employment only in the last week of October 2000, the week just prior to the 
census date.  The census surely detected individuals who work in agriculture during peak 
planting and harvest seasons but not the rest of the time, and they were counted as 
employed in agriculture during the peak autumn harvest season. 
 
 The way employment questions are asked in China’s censuses and the instructions 
for filling out the census forms apparently bias rural household respondents in favor of 
reporting all household members as agricultural workers, even if some adults in the 
family actually work in non-agricultural sectors of the economy most of the time (Young, 
2000, pp. 22-23).  Therefore, the decennial censuses may overreport employment in 
agriculture and underreport actual employment in many industrial and service sectors of 
the economy.  In particular, the censuses of 1990 and 2000 probably underreported the 
total number of manufacturing employees in China. 
 
 Enterprise data refer to who is working in what kind of work at the end of the 
relevant year (end of December).  The urban enterprise statistical reporting form that is 
required to be submitted to authorities early in a calendar year, referring to the previous 
                                                 
2 This calculation procedure for estimating the nationwide employed population from the long form sample 
completely sidesteps the problem that there was a severe undercount of children below age 10 or so in the 
2000 census.  The count of the population ages 15 and older in the 2000 census was rather complete, in that 
it matched the expected adult population as projected from the 1990 census using all available demographic 
information for the interim period, even though there is controversy about whether or not some young and 
middle-aged adults were counted in the wrong places.  See Zhang & Cui, 2003, 2004; Chan, 2003; 
Goodkind & Robinson, 2004.     
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calendar year such as 2000, asks enterprises for the “labor situation” (laodong 
qingkuang), in particular for the “actual situation that year” (ben nian shiji), and 
specifically asks for the numbers of each category of workers at the end of the previous 
year (nianmo renshu).  (See Glossary and Definitions for relevant Chinese-language 
terms.)  Accountants or those who report employment and wage figures on behalf of their 
enterprises or other work units, at least those in urban areas, are given detailed 
instructions on how to report monthly, quarterly, yearend, and annual average figures on 
employment and wages.  The instructions are based on regulations released by China’s 
National Bureau of Statistics, especially in 1990 with further clarifications in 1998 and 
2002, regarding how to report employment and wages (Enterprise statistical reporting 
forms, 2004; Wage reporting instructions, 2004, especially p. 2-1). 
 
    In most other employment categories outside of agriculture, the census also 
estimated a larger employed population for the latter months of the year 2000 than did 
enterprise data that were compiled by China’s Ministry of Labour and Social Security 
(which this report will call “Labour Ministry”) and China’s National Bureau of Statistics 
(NBS).  This may mean that the census detected millions of actual workers that the 
administrative reporting system is regularly missing (Table 1).  For example, in services 
the annual reporting system seems to be leaving out millions of workers, perhaps because 
many service workers are in the informal economy.  On the other hand, the regular 
administrative reporting system recorded more workers than the census in construction, 
transport, and the small categories of geological prospecting and water conservancy, and 
research and technical services.  The annual system also reported 56 million people at 
yearend 2000 in the category “other” unclassified workers, while the census was able to 
classify most workers in one of its standard employment categories (Table 1).  Some of 
these “other” workers may in fact work in two parts of the economy, such as agriculture 
during peak seasons and manufacturing during part of the year. 
 
B. PRC Manufacturing Employment: Census and Enterprise Data Differences 
 
    The discrepancy between census and enterprise data on the number of 
manufacturing workers in China was not huge in the year 2000, at least if we compare 
census data to the total employment figures by sector reported in Table 1 that were 
compiled by China’s Labour Ministry and NBS.  The census estimated 88.43 million 
persons employed in manufacturing during the last week of October 2000 (extrapolated 
from the census long form which was filled out by 10 percent of civilian households).  
Based on the national employment totals published by NBS and the Labour Ministry 
(China NBS & Labour, 2003, pp. 8-9), economic units reported at yearend 2000 that 
employment in manufacturing totaled 80.43 million. 
  
    What can account for this discrepancy of 8 million manufacturing workers between 
census data and the officially compiled enterprise data?  First, the census counted each 
part-time worker as an employed worker.  Anyone who worked more than one hour for 
pay in the week before the census was counted as one employed worker.  Of 
manufacturing workers counted in the census, 3 percent worked fewer than 4 days in the 
prior week, and 97 percent worked full-time or overtime.  Specifically, 39 percent of 
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manufacturing employees worked 4 or 5 days in the prior week for income and 58 
percent worked 6 or 7 days during the 7 days before the census (China NBS, 2002, Vol. 
2, pp. 1578-1579).  Therefore, part-time manufacturing workers can explain some of the 
discrepancy, no more than 2-3 million, between the census-based estimate of total 
manufacturing workers in late 2000 and the official NBS-Labour compilation of yearend 
2000 enterprise data on manufacturing employees.    
 
    The annual enterprise data are actually not supposed to be reporting individuals but 
rather “full-time equivalents,” which in China probably makes very little difference since 
most workers are called full-time even if they are not.  But some of those who worked 
only part-time in manufacturing in late 2000 might have been left out of the yearend 
reported employment data.  Another source of difference could be that people who do 
piece work at home on contract for manufacturing concerns might report their work in the 
census but might not be reported as employed in manufacturing by any enterprise or by 
anyone else in the yearend reporting system. 
 
 Temporary workers in manufacturing who happened to be at work during the last 
week of October 2000 would have, or at least should have been reported by the census as 
employed in manufacturing.  Annual enterprise data also capture some temporary 
workers.  For example, within the category of “on-post urban manufacturing staff and 
workers” in state-owned enterprises in 2002, it was reported that 9.31 million of 9.79 
million (95 percent) were in long-term manufacturing employment, while 0.47 million (5 
percent) were in temporary manufacturing employment (China NBS & Labour, 2003, pp. 
23, 362).  However, long-term or temporary status is reported only for this 10 million of 
China’s reported total of 83 million on-post manufacturing workers in 2002.  The annual 
enterprise reporting system classifies all urban on-post employees as either “long-term,” 
defined as having been working for one year or more, or “temporary, provisional” 
(linshi), defined as having worked for less than one year (Wage reporting instructions, 
2004, p. 1-2).  Many of the latter employees may simply be workers who have not yet 
been on the job long enough to qualify as long-term workers, even though that is the 
intent of both employer and employee.  It is possible that the census included more of 
China’s actual temporary manufacturing workers than are included in the annual 
enterprise reports, though this author has no proof that there is any such bias or shortfall 
in enterprise data. 
 
 A minor cause of differences between census data and annual data on 
manufacturing employment is that the censuses of 1990 and 2000 recorded employment 
of the population ages 15 and older (Census 2000 long form, columns R17-R22), while 
compiled annual data are supposed to refer to the population ages 16 and older (China 
NBS, 2003, p. 181).  According to 2000 census data, extrapolated from the long form to 
the whole population age 15 by this author, the PRC had a total of 334,000 
manufacturing workers who were exact age 15 in the last week of October 2000 (China 
NBS, 2002, Vol. 1, p. 570; Vol. 2, pp. 800, 1269).  Therefore, 0.33 million of the 8.00 
million differential between census and annual enterprise numbers of manufacturing 
workers in China in 2000 could have been caused by the inclusion of workers age 15 in 
census data and their apparent exclusion from annual employment data. 
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 At the older end of the working ages, the census was supposed to include as 
employed workers everyone age 15 and older in the long form sample population who 
had worked for income either part-time or full-time in the week before the census, no 
matter what their age.  China’s regular employment statistics define working ages as 16-
59 for men, 16-54 for women working in white collar jobs, and 16-49 for women in blue 
collar jobs.  In theory, with regard to urban workers, only those in the legal working ages 
are included in the reported category “staff and workers.”  Employed people who are still 
working beyond the statutory working ages, or who have been rehired after retiring from 
a job, are supposed to be included in the category “other” urban employment in a sub-
category of retirement age workers who have been rehired or who have continued 
working (pinyong, liuyong de li tuixiu renyuan).  The legal working ages do not apply to 
agricultural employment, and it is not clear if the formal working ages have any 
relevance for rural or town manufacturing employment.  In theory, annual employment 
statistics as well as census employment statistics should include all those people who are 
working to earn income in their fifties, sixties, and older.  Therefore, at the older working 
ages, there should be no age cutoff in employment statistics and no definitional difference 
between census figures and annual enterprise data on manufacturing or other 
employment. 
 
    The annual data that must be used for this report on employment and wages in 
manufacturing come from the annual yearend statistical reporting system (China’s 
censuses do not ask for wage data).  The China Labour Statistical Yearbook 2003 uses 
census-derived numbers for total, urban, and rural employment each year, and these 
numbers are inconsistent with the totals from the enterprise employment data by sector.  
In manufacturing, the employment totals shown in this report (which are from the annual 
yearend reporting system) may tend to underestimate or leave out marginal, home-based, 
temporary, and/or part-time manufacturing employees. 
 
 In any particular year, the true number of manufacturing workers in China may be 
millions larger than the figure compiled and reported by the NBS and Labour Ministry 
from the regular enterprise reporting system.  This caveat should not alter any 
conclusions we might make about trends in manufacturing employment that are based 
fully on trends in the annual reported statistics.   
 
China Manufacturing Employment 
 
 The annually reported figures on total manufacturing employment in China do, 
nevertheless, include a large majority of manufacturing workers in China.  PRC statistics 
include all manufacturing employees—production workers, salaried workers, and 
supervisory workers.  BLS, referring to manufacturing employment data from countries 
around the world, notes that “more and more statistical agencies publish their data on an 
all employee basis” (personal communication with BLS).  China does this also, and does 
not provide separate data for production line workers.  Table 2 shows figures from 
China’s annual enterprise reporting system on the numbers of employed manufacturing 
workers in the PRC from 1978 through 2002.  It is important to note that these numbers 
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do not include those who have lost their manufacturing jobs and have become formally 
unemployed.    
 
 A. Reported Trends in PRC Manufacturing Employment 
 
 As shown in Table 2, the officially reported total number of employed 
manufacturing workers in China rose dramatically during the post-Mao economic reform 
period from 53 million in 1978 to an all-time high of 98 million in 1995, then reportedly 
declined sharply to 80 million in 2000, then rose again to 83 million by yearend 2002.  
Reported “rural” manufacturing employment has risen throughout this 24-year period 
with few setbacks, peaking at a reported 45 million as of the end of 2002.  The difference 
between reported PRC national and “rural” manufacturing employment should be urban 
manufacturing employment; but this number is not published for a series of years, and the 
column is derived in Table 2 as a residual calculation.  The figures so derived seem to say 
that “urban” manufacturing employment in the PRC rose from 36 million in 1978 to a 
high of 58 million in 1994-1995, then dropped to 38 million by yearend 2002.  A figure 
of 38.018 million for “urban” manufacturing employment is directly reported in a 
published table (China NBS & Labour, 2003, p. 10).  Therefore, this procedure that this 
author has used in Table 2 for deriving urban manufacturing employment seems to be 
defensible.  
 
 The urban or primarily urban component of PRC manufacturing employment is 
directly reported in the latest China Labour Statistical Yearbook in two ways (Table 2): 
as China’s manufacturing “employment in urban units” (chengzhen danwei jiuye 
renyuan) and as PRC urban manufacturing “staff and workers” (zhigong); the latter 
category is completely included in and constitutes almost all of the group called  
“manufacturing employment in urban units.”  Employment in urban manufacturing units 
reportedly dropped from 55 million in 1994-1995 to 30 million by yearend 2002, and 
total urban “staff and workers” in manufacturing increased from 36 million in 1978 to 55 
million in 1992-1993, thereafter declining to 29 million by the end of 2002, based on the 
reported statistics in Table 2. 
  
 B. Change in the Definition of Urban Employed Population  
 
 What do these numbers mean?  In the first place, successive figures are 
sometimes not comparable due to redefinition.  In particular, the number for implied 
“urban” manufacturing employment dropped sharply from 55.8 million at the end of 
1997 to 43.9 million at yearend 1998, an apparent decline of 12 million in one year.  A 
similar drop is shown for manufacturing “employment in urban units,” from 51.3 million 
(end 1997) to 38.3 million (end 1998), down 13 million during 1998.  Urban 
manufacturing “staff and workers” employment numbers declined from 50.8 million to 
37.7 million that year, also a drop of 13 million.  Figures for manufacturing “staff and 
workers” in state-owned (meaning government-owned) units decreased by 11 million that 
year, and in urban collective-owned units went down by 5 million, while increasing in 
“other ownership units” by 3 million. 
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What happened to these manufacturing employment statistics during 1998?  There 
was an important shift in the employment statistics coverage in urban areas.  Starting in 
1998, workers who had been laid off from active employment but were still connected 
with their former employment unit were no longer called “employed,” and were excluded 
from the employment figures (China NBS & Labour, 2003, p. 20).  Therefore, these “off-
post” urban manufacturing workers are not included in the 1998-2002 numbers for urban 
manufacturing employment, manufacturing employment in urban units, or urban on-post 
manufacturing staff and workers.  The PRC works vigorously to promote the 
reemployment of laid-off (“not-on-post”) urban workers; each year, many are laid off and 
many are rehired.  By yearend 2002, the net result of the layoff and rehiring processes 
was that the total number of “not-on-post” urban manufacturing staff and workers totaled 
9.13 million (China NBS & Labour, 2003, p. 243). 
 
C. Urban Manufacturing Employment Categories 
 
Figure 1 shows the structure of manufacturing employment in China, including 
urban manufacturing employment.  There is enormous overlap between the two 
categories “manufacturing employment in urban units” and “urban manufacturing staff 
and workers.”  All “urban manufacturing staff and workers” (who have been only “on-
post” workers since 1998) are included by definition in the category “manufacturing 
employment in urban units.”  In every year for which both series are available, 1994-
2002, the grouping “manufacturing employment in urban units” is slightly larger (0.5-0.7 
million larger) than the category “urban manufacturing staff and workers” (Table 2).  The 
residual half a million to three-quarters of a million workers in urban manufacturing units 
include urban reemployed retirees and foreign, Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan 
employees of manufacturing units, among others (China NBS & Labour, 2003, p. 638). 
 
For example, at yearend 2002, the PRC recorded 29.807 million total employment 
in urban manufacturing units, and 29.069 million urban manufacturing staff and workers, 
the difference between them being approximately 0.738 million (Table 2; Figure 1; China 
NBS & Labour, 2003, pp. 13, 230).  This residual is accounted for by “Other urban 
manufacturing employment” of 738,885 reported for yearend 2002, of whom 150,470 
were reemployed and continuing workers of retirement age (China NBS & Labour, 2003, 
p. 249).  Who were the remaining 588,000 employees in urban manufacturing units?  The 
Labour Ministry clearly has collected data on how many of these are foreign personnel, 
but the China Labour Statistical Yearbook 2003 does not report this information.  (The 
volume does report that only 50,045 out of all the “Other urban employment” in all 
sectors of the economy, totaling 4.28 million, were “Hong Kong, Macao, Taiwan & 
Foreign Personnel” at year-end 2002.  This small number implies that the great majority 
of the hundreds of thousands of foreign experts, technical and administrative workers, 
teachers, managers, and entrepreneurs actually working in the PRC have been classified, 
or misclassified, as working in “rural” areas, or are not recorded as working at all.)  
Therefore, only a small proportion of the “Other” 0.59 million urban manufacturing 
employees at yearend 2002 could be recorded in the statistics as foreign personnel.  The 
rest of the “Other” urban manufacturing employees work for urban manufacturing 
enterprises but are in statistical categories such as employees lent from another company, 
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holding a second job, or working without a contract because they have not completed 
employment formalities (Enterprise statistical reporting forms, 2004; Wage reporting 
instructions, 2004). 
  
The larger urban category of “manufacturing employment in urban units” 
included only 29.8 million of the 38.0 million total for yearend 2002 “urban 
manufacturing employment” (Table 2 and Figure 1).  The other 8.2 million were in 
relatively small privately owned and privately operated enterprises (siying qiye) and self-
employed individual or family enterprises (geti jiuye) in urban manufacturing (China 
NBS & Labour, 2003, p. 169).  China’s urban (chengzhen) manufacturing workforce in 
2002 included 2.6 million workers (congye renyuan) in getihu (individual and household 
enterprises) and 5.6 million working in privately owned siying qiye.  In the latter 
category, 0.8 million workers were categorized as “investors” in their own companies 
(touzizhe renshu) and 4.8 million were called hired laborers or hired hands (gugong 
renshu) (China SAIC, 2003, pp. 583, 587).  (For more detail see Glossary and 
Definitions: Employed; Hired laborers; Investors; Manufacturing economic 
organizations—urban; Private enterprises; Self-employed enterprises.)   
 
Many of China’s urban manufacturing workers have migrated into cities and their 
suburbs from rural areas.  These rural-to-urban in-migrants, if they had been in the city 
for 6 months or longer, were supposed to be included in 2000 census figures on urban 
manufacturing employees.  Also, annual enterprise data for urban manufacturing units 
are, in theory, required to include workers from rural areas in the category of urban 
manufacturing “staff and workers.”  Specifically, the urban employment classification 
“on-post staff and workers” (zai gang zhigong) includes the category “workers whose 
population registration is in rural areas” (hukou zai nongcun de renyuan); all these figures 
are to be reported monthly, quarterly, and annually (Wage reporting instructions, 2004; 
Enterprise statistical reporting forms, 2004).  Even though both census data for the cities 
and regular administrative data from manufacturing enterprises in the cities are supposed 
to include rural-to-urban migrant workers, many of the workers themselves may avoid 
being counted in the city during the census, and employers may minimize the numbers of 
migrant workers they include in their routine reporting to the authorities. 
      
Trends in PRC Manufacturing Employment 
 
 In order to gauge trends in manufacturing employment in China, we must adjust 
for the change of definition in the urban data.  It is important to recognize that before and 
even after the definitional change in 1998, reported urban manufacturing employment 
figures for China included and continue to include millions of surplus workers (Brooks & 
Tao, 2003; McGuckin & Spiegelman, 2004, p. 12).  By the end of 2002, of those surplus 
manufacturing workers, 9.13 million were in the laid-off category, but through 1997 they 
were still nominally employed in their manufacturing work units.  Therefore, one way to 
estimate true trends in manufacturing employment in China is to add the not-on-post 
(laid-off) workers to the employed workers in the most recent year, and compare this 
total to the employment figures for the mid-1990s that included the surplus or laid-off 
workers in the reported employment total and did not report how many had been laid off: 
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   China, Employed + Surplus Laid-off Manufacturing Workers, 1992-1996 and 2002 
 
Year 
 PRC official 
manufacturing 
employment + 
off-postlaid 
off-workers  
PRC “rural” 
manufacturing 
employment  
PRC “urban” 
manufacturing 
employment + 
off-post laid-
off workers  
Manufacturing 
“Employment 
in urban units” 
+ off-post laid-
off workers  
Manufacturing 
urban “ staff 
and workers” 
+ off-post laid-
off workers  
    
1992  91.06  34.68  56.38   55.08  
1993  92.95  36.59  56.36   54.69  
1994  96.13  38.49  57.64  54.92  54.34  
1995  98.03  39.71  58.32  54.93  54.39  
1996  97.63  40.19  57.44  53.44  52.93  
    
2002  83.07 + 9.13 = 45.06  
38.02 + 9.13 
= 
29.81 + 9.13  
= 
29.07 + 9.13  
= 
 92.2   47.15  38.94  38.2  
 
Sources: Table 2 and text.  
 
As calculated in the above summary table, total PRC “urban” manufacturing employed 
and surplus (including laid-off) workers peaked at 58 million in 1994-1995 and dropped 
to 47 million (38 + 9 million) by yearend 2002, a decline of 11 million.  Manufacturing 
employment and surplus workers in “urban” units dropped from 55 million in 1994-1995 
to 39 million (30 + 9 million) in 2002, a drop of 16 million.  “Urban” manufacturing 
(including surplus) staff and workers peaked at 55 million in 1992-1993 and declined to 
38 million (29 + 9 million) in 2002, a decline of 17 million.  Reported official total PRC 
manufacturing employment including surplus and laid-off manufacturing workers 
declined from 98 million in 1995-1996 to 92 million (83 + 9 million) in 2002, dropping 6 
million for China as a whole, based on the NBS and Labour Ministry compilation of PRC 
manufacturing employment in Table 2. 
 
 Some manufacturing workers in urban China have also become fully recognized 
as “unemployed” (see Glossary and Definitions: Unemployment rate).  Of the yearend 
2002 registered unemployed urban workers who were previously employed (2.17 
million), 41 percent had lost manufacturing jobs (China NBS & Labour, 2003, pp. 96, 
126).  This implies that 0.89 million former “urban” manufacturing workers were 
classified as unemployed as of the end of 2002. 
 
 Therefore, manufacturing employment in China increased vigorously until 1995 
and has declined since then, whether we rely on the reported data as compiled by the 
Labour Ministry and the NBS or try to adjust for definitional change.  “Urban” state-
owned and collective-owned manufacturing enterprises have lost most of their employed 
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workers since the early 1990s, as shown in Table 2.  The majority of their former workers 
have been laid off, fired, subjected to early retirement, or retained by their enterprise as it 
was sold, privatized, or became a joint Chinese-foreign company in the last decade 1992-
2002.  Meanwhile, “rural” manufacturing employment reportedly has continued to 
increase, and in “urban” areas, manufacturing employment in “other ownership units” has 
grown rapidly in this decade.  This category includes manufacturing enterprises with joint 
(Chinese-foreign) ownership, share-holding stock ownership, limited liability 
corporations, and foreign-owned enterprises (China NBS & Labour, 2003, p. 637).  What 
these numbers appear to mean is the following: 
 
--PRC manufacturing is becoming less bloated with surplus workers over time, 
--The total number of manufacturing workers (however defined) in China has 
declined somewhat since 1995, 
--Urban state-owned and urban collective-owned enterprises have shown steep 
declines in numbers of manufacturing workers since the mid-1990s, 
--So-called “rural” manufacturing is still growing, and 
--“Urban” private sector manufacturing employment is expanding. 
 
 Research by Thomas Rawski helps us understand better what is going on in some 
parts of the PRC manufacturing sector.  He documented the decline in urban staff and 
worker manufacturing employment in China from 1993 to 2002.  Using detailed data 
from several engineering sectors producing widely-used industrial components, Rawski 
showed a 52 percent increase in labor productivity (value added per worker) in the short 
period from 1996 to 2000, while employment in these sectors dropped steeply by the year 
2000 to only 63 percent of the 1996 numbers and output was nearly stagnant.  He noted: 
“These data reveal industries in the throes of restructuring rather than dynamic growth” 
(Rawski, 2003).  China’s manufacturing sector is shedding surplus workers and 
becoming more productive and competitive.  Meanwhile, Rawski pointed out, laid-off 
manufacturing workers in China and in developed countries such as the U.S. and Japan 
are experiencing similar dislocations in their personal and family lives. 
 
 The Conference Board of the U.S. has emphasized that China is losing many 
more manufacturing jobs than the developed world (including the United States)—and in 
many of the same industries where the developed world has seen the greatest declines.  
PRC manufacturing industries with the greatest job losses during 1995-2002 were 
textiles, steel processing, machinery, and non-metal mineral products.  China’s 
manufacturing job losses can be traced to restructuring of extraordinarily inefficient state-
owned and urban collective-owned factories and to rapidly advancing labor productivity 
(McGuckin & Spiegelman, 2004, pp. 4-5, 11-13, 17).        
 
Urban and Rural Manufacturing Workers 
 
In China’s annual statistics for employment in manufacturing, the categories 
“rural” (xiangcun) and “urban” (chengzhen) are severely problematic (see Glossary and 
Definitions: Urban and rural”).  If these employment statistics followed the PRC official 
statistical definition of “urban” and “rural” places and populations, then “urban” would 
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include manufacturing employment in cities (chengshi or cheng) and in towns that have 
been incorporated as urban places (zhen).  The urban manufacturing figures should 
include actual workers in manufacturing in cities and towns no matter whether the 
workers have their permanent residence registration there or not.  If rural villagers are 
employed full-time in manufacturing in an urban town (zhen) or in a city, then based on 
the NBS statistical definition of urban, these manufacturing employees should be 
classified in the data as urban manufacturing workers.  Indeed, China’s census of 
November 1, 2000, reported (extrapolating from the long form sample to the whole 
civilian population ages 15 and above) that China had 41.96 million employed 
manufacturing workers in cities and 18.41 million employed manufacturing workers in 
urban towns (zhen), for a total of 60.36 million urban manufacturing workers, 
constituting 68 percent of all the manufacturing workers in China based on census data; 
the census counted 28.07 million rural (xiangcun) manufacturing workers, 32 percent of 
the enumerated manufacturing workers (China NBS, 2002, Vol. 2, pp. 888, 942, 996, 
1050).  As it is, the 2000 census may have underestimated the urban proportion of PRC 
manufacturing employment because rural workers who had moved to towns or cities 
within the previous 6 months and were working in manufacturing there would be counted 
back in their village for the census, and therefore might be called rural manufacturing 
workers or even rural agricultural workers. 
 
 Table 2 shows, however, that the annual statistics for yearend 2000 recorded 
urban manufacturing employment of only 39 million (fewer than the 2000 census counted 
in the cities alone), merely 49 percent of the reported national total, while manufacturing 
employment of 41 million, more than half of PRC manufacturing employment, was 
classified as rural.  Worse, manufacturing “employment in urban units” was reported as 
only 33 million that year, and merely 32 million urban manufacturing “staff and workers” 
were reported then.  China’s 2000 census used a comparatively careful definition of 
“urban” population and employment that has been refined by the NBS during the last two 
decades.  The NBS official statistical definition of urban and rural populations and 
employment is arguably the best standard for other PRC statistics to follow.  The 
breakdown of PRC annual manufacturing employment statistics into rural and the various 
urban categories is inconsistent with China’s own statistical definitions of urban and 
rural. 
 
 The inconsistencies between census and annually reported data on urban and rural 
manufacturing employment arise in part because annual data are “administrative.”  The 
regular statistics are based on administrative geographical boundaries rather than on 
statistical distinctions between rural and urban.  In the administrative data, “urban” 
includes only cities and perhaps also the county seat (county town) in each county of 
China, while “rural” is everywhere else including all other towns that are officially 
established as urban towns (Fox & Zhao, 2002, p. 27).  Unfortunately, in annual PRC 
manufacturing employment statistics, the word “urban” appears to be a misnomer.  The 
data appear to refer to manufacturing employment only in China’s cities and perhaps 
some of their immediate suburbs and the county towns.  Apparently almost all of China’s 
manufacturing employment in urban towns (zhen) and rural areas is lumped together as 
“rural” manufacturing employment. 
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A Major Statistical Anomaly in PRC Manufacturing Employment Data 
 
 China’s statistics on manufacturing employment suffer from an important 
inconsistency that must be tackled.  The PRC Labour Ministry concerns itself primarily 
with city employment, while the Ministry of Agriculture is responsible for data on rural 
and town (zhen) employment.  This division of responsibility is a legacy of the Maoist 
command economy era and it has not yet been corrected.  Therefore, the Labour Ministry 
publication China Labour Statistical Yearbook concerns itself almost entirely with city 
employment and wage statistics; even within cities, the Labour Ministry focuses its data 
collection and reporting on the rapidly declining urban state-owned and collective 
enterprises.  The Labour Ministry calls these data “urban” statistics.  Meanwhile, the 
Agriculture Ministry collects employment and wage data from the village and town 
enterprises (TVEs), including those engaged in manufacturing, and publishes the data in 
its own publications.  It appears that no one coordinates these data.  For example, the 
National Bureau of Statistics and the Labour Ministry, when calculating total 
manufacturing employment in China, seem to completely ignore the Agriculture Ministry 
data from the TVEs. 
 
 This problem is illustrated in Table 2 and Figure 1.  The right hand columns in 
Table 2 report Agriculture Ministry data on employment in industry (gongye) TVEs since 
1978.  This category is almost all employment in manufacturing.  (The rest of “industry” 
employment is the two relatively small categories of (a) mining and (b) production and 
supply of electricity, gas, and water.)  In 2003 for the first time, an Agriculture Ministry 
publication reported the number of TVE manufacturing employees (for yearend 2002), 
and that number constituted 92.4 percent of TVE industry employment.  Arbitrarily using 
that same percentage for the years starting in 1990, this author has estimated TVE 
manufacturing employment during 1990-2001 (Table 2, far right column). 
 
 It is important to note that TVE industry employment data had a sudden 
definitional shift in 1997, in which the total reported number dropped sharply, only to rise 
again the following year.  Rawski said that the 1995 industrial census had shown massive 
exaggeration in TVE statistics, and thought that the 1996-98 shifts in the employment 
numbers might reflect a short-lived effort to improve the TVE data that was then 
abandoned the next year (Rawski, 2003, p. 3).  Whatever the 1997 discontinuity means, it 
was mostly rescinded in 1998.  This author has been unable to discover enough 
information on what the TVE industry employment numbers actually mean and do not 
mean, how part-time or part-year employees are treated in the data, and therefore whether 
TVE industry employee numbers are overreported or underreported or about right.  
 
 The Table 2 column on “PRC manufacturing employment” does not include all 
the reported TVE manufacturing employees.  How do we know this?  The reason is that 
all or almost all the reported “urban” manufacturing employees in China are not in TVEs.  
The category urban “staff and workers” explicitly excludes all TVE employees (China 
NBS, 2003, p. 181).  The rules about how to report the “other” urban enterprise 
employees that, with staff and workers, constitute “employment in urban units” have 
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nothing to do with TVEs (Enterprise statistical reporting forms, 2004; Wage reporting 
instructions, 2004, pp. 1-1 to 1-2). 
 
It may be that some of the residual 8.21 million “urban” manufacturing 
employees who were self-employed or worked in small private enterprises in 2002 were 
also called TVE employees, but this appears unlikely given the way urban and rural 
employment data for China are reported (China NBS, 2003, p. 123; West, 2004).  These 
workers are in cities, while TVE manufacturing employees work outside the cities in 
rural areas and in towns.  Among PRC manufacturing workers in 2002, there were 21.35 
million employees in small private enterprises (siying qiye) and individual or family 
enterprises (geti duzi qiye).  Of these, 8.21 million were in the cities, while 13.14 million 
were “rural,” meaning non-city; it is likely that the latter group was included in 2002 
TVE manufacturing employment and wage statistics (China NBS, 2003, pp. 146-147).         
 
 If we subtract the 29.81 million PRC manufacturing employees in urban units at 
yearend 2002 from the total PRC manufacturing employment figure for the same year 
(Table 2), this leaves only 53 million manufacturing employees who could be working in 
TVEs.  Yet the Agriculture Ministry reported 70.85 million TVE employees in 
manufacturing that year (Table 2).       
 
 Figure 2 graphs two different estimates of total manufacturing employment in 
China.  The “reported” series is the NBS and Labour Ministry constructed series “PRC 
manufacturing employment” in Table 2.  The higher series assumes that the Table 2 
columns “Derived urban manufacturing employment” (referring to cities) and TVE 
manufacturing employment (referring primarily to villages and towns) are mutually 
exclusive and do not overlap; this series is the sum of those two sets of data (see Figure 2; 
figures from the two series in Figure 2 are given in Table 3).  Both series indicate that 
total manufacturing employment in China peaked in the mid-1990s; there were 
definitional shifts in TVE industry employment data and then in urban manufacturing 
employment data during 1996-98; there was a slow decline in PRC manufacturing 
employment in the late 1990s; and beginning in 2001 or 2002 there was a slight increase 
in national manufacturing employment. 
 
 The “urban + TVE” series in Figure 2 and Table 3 suggests that China had 109 
million manufacturing employees by yearend 2002, while the officially compiled series 
reported 83 million, a difference of 26 million.  Which series is correct or more correct? 
 
On the one hand, if we compare yearend 2000 totals from the two series in Figure 
2 and Table 3 with 2000 census-based estimates of manufacturing employment, the 
census found about 8 million more manufacturing workers in China than the NBS-Labour 
Ministry compilation that year (see Table 1), but 20 million fewer than the TVE + urban 
manufacturing employment total for that date.  This would argue in favor of the official 
series. 
 
On the other hand, the urban + TVE series agrees with the results of the 1995 
industrial census.  The industrial census counted 147 million workers in industry 
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(gongye) nationwide.  If 89 percent of “industry” employees were in manufacturing in 
1995 (as implied by the official annual administrative data series, China NBS & Labour, 
2003, p. 8), that would be 131 million total PRC manufacturing workers in 1995. The 
total of urban + TVE manufacturing employment for yearend 1995 was 128 million; this 
argues for using the urban + TVE series to estimate total manufacturing employment in 
China. (Young also showed that the NBS and Labour Ministry compilation of national 
manufacturing employment in 1995 was highly inconsistent with the 1995 industrial 
census results; Young, 2000, p. 22 & Table XI.) 
 
More information is needed to determine which series is more correct for the total 
manufacturing employment in China 1990-2002.  Tentatively, this author favors the use 
of the urban + TVE series on manufacturing employment over the official series.  The 
reason is that NBS and the Labour Ministry appear to have little usable information on 
their figure of 45 million “rural” manufacturing workers.  Nothing is published except 
that one number, and there is no information available about how this number was 
derived or estimated.  At least for the TVE manufacturing workers, a branch of the 
Agriculture Ministry has gathered some information on these manufacturing employees 
and on the wages paid to them and has published a little information. 
 
If the urban + TVE series on manufacturing employment is the more correct 
series, this means that the 2000 census long form may have underestimated the true 
number of manufacturing workers in China on November 1, 2000, by about (108 – 88 =) 
20 million manufacturing employees (see Tables 1 & 3).  This author has previously 
pointed out that the census questionnaire and instructions for enumerators may tend to 
bias the responses of rural households in favor of reporting all members as engaged in 
agricultural employment, even if a family member is working in manufacturing (Young, 
2000, pp. 22-23).  Another problem is that 2000 census enumerators, when they located 
migrants, probably tended to hand them a short census form to fill out, whereas 
households were sampled to decide which would receive the long form.  The result of 
these procedures might be that employment in industry or service sectors favored by 
migrants might thereby be underestimated by the census long form (Daniel Goodkind, 
personal communication).  
 
If the urban + TVE manufacturing series is the more correct series, then the PRC 
reported about 128 million manufacturing employees at yearend 1995 and 130 million at 
yearend 1996 (Table 3).  In 1997 and 1998, statistical changes and corrections and 
redefinitions in both TVE data and urban employment data dropped the PRC total 
manufacturing employment figure (urban + TVE) to approximately 112 million by 
yearend 1998, of which 44 million were “urban” and about 68 million were called “TVE” 
(see Table 2).  Since then, TVE manufacturing employment apparently rose slowly each 
year to 71 million at yearend 2002, while on-post (not laid-off) “urban” manufacturing 
employment dropped from 44 million to 38 million.  Total “urban” + TVE manufacturing 
employment in the PRC declined by 4 million from 112 million in 1998 to 108 million in 
2000-2001, then rose slightly to 109 million by yearend 2002, as shown in Table 3 and 
Figure 2. 
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Structure of Manufacturing Employment in China           
 
 Figure 1 displays the structure of PRC manufacturing employment at the end of 
2002, the latest date for which statistics are currently available, no matter which of the 
national totals is more correct.  China’s National Bureau of Statistics and Labour 
Ministry published a total figure of 83 million manufacturing employees in the PRC, of 
whom 45 million were called “rural” and 38 million were classified as “urban.”  But 
these data apparently do not take full account of the 71 million TVE manufacturing 
workers reported by the Ministry of Agriculture.  Based on the reasonable assumption 
that the 38 million “urban” and the 71 million TVE manufacturing employment 
categories are mutually exclusive, the total manufacturing employment at yearend 2002 
was about 109 million, as shown in Figure 1. 
 
 Because of the city bias of employment statistics in China, there is almost no 
further readily available detail about the 45 million “rural” or the 71 million TVE 
manufacturing employees.  This is the biggest weakness of PRC statistics on 
manufacturing employment. 
 
Of the 38 million “urban” manufacturing employees at yearend 2002 shown in 
Figure 1, 30 million were employed in so-called urban manufacturing units (danwei), and 
of these, 29 million were on-post (not laid-off or unemployed) staff and workers.  The 
majority of these urban manufacturing staff and workers (16 million) were employed by 
corporations, joint ventures, and other non-public sector companies in China’s growing 
private sector.  Manufacturing employment in urban state-owned enterprises had dropped 
steeply to 10 million, and in urban collective units had declined to only 3 million. 
 
 The other 8 million of China’s 38 million “urban” manufacturing employees at 
yearend 2002 were working in small individual and private businesses, in the sub-
categories given in Figure 1.  Therefore, the private sector now employs at least 24 
million of the reported 38 million PRC urban manufacturing workers. 
         
Occupational Categories of China’s Manufacturing Workers 
 
 Table 4 gives us the broad occupational breakdown of those who were working in 
manufacturing enterprises in the last week of October 2000, based on a 10 percent sample 
of households in every PRC locality in the 2000 census.  (This author has not been able to 
locate a similar breakdown reported for the annual data on manufacturing workers.)  
According to the census, manufacturing included 67 million production, transport, 
equipment, and related workers; such line workers constituted 76 percent of workers in 
the manufacturing sector.  The second largest group in manufacturing was 8 million sales 
and service workers, who made up 9 percent of the total.  There were 5 million 
professional and technical workers, making up 6 percent of manufacturing employees.  
Clerical workers numbered 4 million, constituting 5 percent of the total.  There were 3 
million administrators and managers, 3 percent of manufacturing employment. 
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 Census data showed that there was a surprising degree of balance in the total 
numbers of men and women working in China’s manufacturing.  Of recorded 
manufacturing workers, 54 percent were men and 46 percent women.  There were only 3 
million more male than female production workers, a total of 35 million men and 32 
million women.  Men strongly dominated management, as well as sales and service and 
clerical staff.  There were more women than men in the professional/technical category.  
Within the manufacturing sector, however, factory observations suggest that women do 
most of the low-paid meticulous hand-assembly of light industrial products, while men 
dominate the better-paying jobs as machinists and equipment operators.   
 
Compensation of Manufacturing Workers in China 
 
 This project is attempting to measure or estimate the average hourly 
compensation of all manufacturing workers in China, or if that is not possible, of a subset 
of China’s manufacturing workers.  It is reassuring to note that statistical authorities in 
the PRC’s National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) do indeed try to use an internationally 
recognizable definition of employee compensation in the calculation of China’s Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP).  NBS defines what it variously translates as “compensation of 
employees” or “laborers’ remuneration” (laodongzhe baochou) as follows: 
Laodongzhe baochou refers to the whole payment of various forms earned by the 
laborers from the productive activities they are engaged in.  It includes wages, 
bonuses, and allowances the laborers earned in monetary form and in kind.  It also 
includes the free medical services provided to the laborers and the medicine 
expenses, transport subsidies, social insurance, and housing fund paid by the 
employers (China NBS, 2003, pp. 66, 84, 87, 90).  
 
This quotation also suggests that China’s government either collects data on these various 
components of worker compensation or at least estimates them for its calculations of 
China’s GDP. 
 
Manufacturing Wages and Earnings in China 
 
 A. Reported Labor Compensation in Chinese Currency 
 
 Compensation data for manufacturing workers in China are poorly and partially 
reported.  The available data come from the annual yearend reporting system, and the 
fragmentary figures are published in the China Labour Statistical Yearbook, and for TVE 
employees, from China Village and Town Yearbook 2003.  Table 5 presents the major 
published numbers on annual average 2002 “wages” or “earnings” for PRC 
manufacturing workers.  It is not clear why the annual average remuneration for 
manufacturing workers is called “wages” (gongzi) when referring to “staff and workers” 
but is called “earnings” or remuneration or compensation (laodong baochou) when 
referring to the employees of urban manufacturing units.  These two terms appear to 
mean almost exactly the same thing.  Both terms are defined as: 
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The total wage bill and total labor compensation are calculated this way: They 
include whatever is paid to or for the workers in money or in kind according to 
relevant regulations, including salaries paid for a certain time period or payments 
based on piece work, bonuses, allowances, subsidies, overtime pay, and pay for 
dangerous or challenging duty (China NBS & Labour, 2003, pp. 630, 638).   
  
 Table 5 tells us that the 30 million on-post (not laid off or unemployed) 
employees of manufacturing enterprises in China’s cities had average reported 
compensation of 11,152 yuan for the year 2002.  Of these employees, 95 percent were 
“staff and workers” whose average compensation that year was 11,001 yuan, and 5 
percent were the ¾ million “other” category of city manufacturing workers who averaged 
much higher income of 17,237 yuan in 2002 (because foreign employees of China’s 
manufacturing companies and re-employed or still employed retirement age workers with 
high seniority get higher wages). 
 
The recorded 9 million laid-off manufacturing workers still nominally connected 
to their manufacturing units averaged a small living subsidy of 2,213 yuan for the year 
2002.  This kind of payment might be considered similar to payments of unemployment 
compensation for laid-off or unemployed workers in developed countries. 
 
 For the reported 71 million manufacturing TVE employees in 2002, a 2003 
Agriculture Ministry publication reported for the first time ever (to this author’s 
knowledge) the total labor compensation (laodongzhe baochou) paid out for the whole 
year 2002 in all manufacturing TVEs (China Ministry of Agriculture, 2003, pp. 130-131).  
The publication did not calculate the average per worker labor compensation for the year, 
so this figure is derived in Table 5 in the same way that the average annual wage or labor 
compensation is calculated for urban manufacturing workers.  TVE manufacturing 
workers averaged only 6,927 yuan in reported labor compensation for 2002, 62 percent of 
the average wage that year for employees of urban manufacturing units.  Workers in 
large-scale manufacturing TVEs earned higher average labor compensation of 8,899 yuan 
in 2002, which was 80 percent of the average reported labor compensation for employees 
of urban manufacturing units. 
 
 What forms of compensation are included in these average annual labor 
compensation figures?  Figure 3 lists all the items whose value should be included in 
wage data reported by enterprises in urban China, based on written instructions to 
enterprise accountants and statistical personnel.  Most forms of income, benefits, and 
subsidies in cash and in kind are in this list.  Cash salary and wage payments, housing 
and transport provided to workers, meals given to them, and the value of income tax and 
social insurance payments deducted from wages and remitted to the government on 
behalf of the employee are all supposed to be part of the “total wage” figure (gongzi 
zong’e), based on relevant reporting regulations.   
 
 What kinds of labor compensation are not included in the average wage and labor 
compensation figures reported in Table 5?  For TVE workers, the figures reported in the 
table probably include essentially all or almost all of the benefits and money these 
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workers receive.  China’s urban towns and rural areas have very weak or nonexistent 
social benefit systems for pensions, medical insurance, unemployment insurance, 
workers’ compensation, etc.  Fox & Zhao (2002) and Qiao (2004) report that pension and 
medical insurance systems paid into by employers and employees essentially do not exist 
in the PRC outside of cities today.  A 2002 survey of large manufacturing enterprises in 
Nanjing Municipality, the capital of Jiangsu Province on the east coast of China, found 
that welfare benefits for workers, above and beyond wages, for the years 1994-2001 
averaged 36 percent of the wage in urban state-owned manufacturing enterprises, but 
only 16 percent of the wage in unusually large manufacturing TVEs in counties under 
Nanjing’s administration (Dong, 2004, Table 1, pp. 28-29).  These TVEs surely had an 
exceptionally high level of welfare benefits compared to all manufacturing TVEs in 
China during those years, both because TVEs in counties near major cities have better 
social welfare benefits than TVEs elsewhere, and because large TVEs have better 
benefits than average-sized TVEs.  On the other hand, average manufacturing TVE 
worker welfare benefits in 2002 were very likely a higher percent of their wages than in 
earlier years.  Therefore, pending the discovery of better data for 2002, this author 
tentatively estimates that in 2002, the average total of social insurance and other welfare 
benefits for PRC manufacturing TVE employees was in the range from zero to 16 percent 
of their total wage.  (Such an estimation procedure of course does not meet BLS 
standards for comparing labor compensation across countries.)          
 
For urban manufacturing workers, however, there are a few items that perhaps 
should be considered part of labor compensation (from an international comparative 
perspective), but which are specifically excluded from the reported total wage and labor 
compensation data reported by enterprises on required official forms. 
 
 The major excluded category is the following.  China’s cities today have or are in 
the process of building municipal social insurance funds and housing funds to which both 
employers and employees are required to contribute each month, at least in theory (Qiao, 
2004).  There are five kinds of funds to which employees and/or employers are supposed 
to separately contribute each month: old-age pension fund (yanglao baoxian), medical 
insurance fund (yiliao baoxian), unemployment insurance fund (shiye baoxian), workers’ 
compensation fund (gongshang baoxian) and a fund in which money is supposedly set 
aside for each worker by name--money that the worker can use to help buy an apartment 
(zhufang gong jijin).  It is likely that not every city has all these kinds of funds 
successfully in place to date.  The payments deducted from employee wages for these 
five public funds and remitted to city governments are indeed included in the reported 
wage and labor compensation data (see Figure 3).  But the part paid by employers is 
excluded from labor compensation data (Wage reporting instructions, 2004, p. 2-5).  
According to BLS, such legally required payments to government social insurance and 
employee benefit programs must be included in BLS figures for hourly labor 
compensation in manufacturing (BLS, 1997, p. 114-115; Sparks, Bikoi, & Moglia, 2002, 
p. 37).  In the PRC, these monthly payments by employers to city governments are 
mandatory and stiff penalties are specified for noncompliance (China State Council, 
1999).  Nevertheless, noncompliance is rampant and penalties are rarely enforced.  
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 Another group of benefits that is provided by some manufacturing enterprises to 
employees but specifically excluded from the total wage or labor compensation figures is 
use of a company medical clinic or payment of some employee hospital costs (Wage 
reporting instructions, 2004, p. 2-4).  It would seem that this is an important benefit that 
conceptually ought to be included in labor compensation data.  But many countries share 
this shortcoming in compensation statistics, with the result that BLS specifically excludes 
this employee benefit from its comparative international data on labor compensation in 
manufacturing (BLS, 1997, pp. 114-115; Sparks, Bikoi, & Moglia, 2002, p. 49).  This 
report will therefore not include any estimation of these particular medical benefits that 
are missing from PRC compensation data.    
 
 A problem with the compensation data in Table 5 is that no compensation figures 
are reported for the small privately-owned manufacturing groupings and the self-
employed manufacturing workers in China’s cities.  They totaled 8.2 million in 2002 (see 
Figure 1), based on the difference between the two columns “derived urban 
manufacturing employment” and “manufacturing employment in urban units” in Table 2, 
and on data from China’s State Administration for Industry and Commerce (SAIC).  This 
weakness in PRC wage data parallels the same dearth in manufacturing compensation 
data from most countries.  BLS deals with these common data shortcomings as follows.  
First, labor compensation for employees in small manufacturing units is not included in 
BLS estimates of hourly labor compensation in manufacturing: “….the data exclude very 
small establishments (less than 5 employees in Japan and less than 10 employees in most 
European and some other countries)” (Sparks, Bikoi, & Moglia, 2002, p. 49).  Second: 
“Compensation for self-employed workers is calculated by assuming that their hourly 
compensation is equal to the average for wage and salary employees” (BLS, 1997, p. 
114).  
 
 The average annual earnings of the 30 million workers in manufacturing units 
located in China’s cities and their immediate suburbs (11,152 yuan) masks a wide range 
of earnings in different urban manufacturing sub-sectors, as shown in Table 6.  For 
example, the lowest-paid group of city manufacturing workers is the 3 million textile 
industry workers, whose earnings average only 7,268 yuan per year.  The 5 million city 
manufacturing workers in the sub-sectors of timber and bamboo products, food 
processing, nonmetal mineral products, paper products, furniture manufacturing, and 
“other” manufacturing also earn little: their reported average annual earnings are only 
8,227 yuan.  At the other end of the pay spectrum, the 8 million city manufacturing 
workers in tobacco processing, electronics and telecommunications, petroleum 
processing, ferrous metal smelting, transport equipment manufacturing, medical and 
pharmaceutical products, and specialized machine tools have average annual earnings of 
15,474 yuan. 
 
 B. China Manufacturing Labor Compensation in Dollars 
 
 To translate reported average annual wages for PRC manufacturing workers into 
dollars, let us first use official, nominal exchange rates between U.S. dollars and PRC 
yuan or renminbi.  The procedure used by BLS to compare the hourly labor 
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compensation of manufacturing workers in different countries is to use the legal 
exchange rate in the case of countries like China with fixed exchange rates, and to use 
actual exchange rates if currencies are allowed to float: “The measures [total 
compensation costs per hour worked] are computed in national currency and converted 
into U.S. dollars at prevailing commercial market currency exchange rates” (BLS, 1997, 
p. 111).  The Chinese yuan has been pegged to the U.S. dollar at 8.28 yuan per dollar for 
a decade since 1994; there is discussion about making changes to the currency peg but 
this has not happened to date (Hale & Hale, 2003; Lardy, 2003; Sender, 2004). 
 
But prices for most purchases in China are low, so this dollar figure does not 
adequately capture the purchasing power of the incomes of PRC manufacturing workers.  
One way to better account for different purchasing power of different currencies is to 
utilize the “purchasing power parity” (PPP) exchange rate as estimated by the World 
Bank based on the cost of a comparable “basket” of goods in the two currencies, yuan in 
China and dollars in the U.S. or on the international market.  “PPP rates allow a standard 
comparison of real price levels between countries” (World Bank, 2003, p. 265).  Table 5 
adjusts PRC manufacturing wages or earnings (reported in Chinese yuan) to account for 
additional labor compensation costs that are not included in the wage data, then calculates 
the range of yuan estimates in commercial exchange rate dollars and then in international 
PPP dollars. (For calculating labor compensation in international dollars, multiply labor 
compensation in dollars at official exchange rate times 4.65; see World Bank, 2003, pp. 
252-253). 
 
In theory, use of market or commercial exchange rates is most appropriate for 
some purposes, and use of PPP exchange rates is the best method for other purposes: 
 
PPP is not appropriate for everything.  Trade and capital flows, unlike the bulk of 
GDP, are actually transacted at market exchange rates, and should be converted 
into dollars at those rates.  PPP is useful in showing how much a country’s money 
is worth in its home market, but it does not measure effective purchasing power 
across borders.  What matters for businesses that trade internationally is China’s 
buying power in current-dollar terms (Economist, 2004d). 
 
This report gives PRC manufacturing wages in Chinese domestic currency, dollars at 
commercial exchange rates, and PPP international dollars in order to allow selection of 
the appropriate measures for different purposes. 
 
1) Wages of TVE Manufacturing Employees in Dollars 
 
At the official exchange rate, China’s manufacturing workers in village and town 
enterprises (TVEs) in 2002 averaged 6,927 yuan = US$ 837 in reported annual labor 
compensation (Tables 5 and 7).  For TVE manufacturing employees, the reported 2002 
labor compensation total may capture basically all of their remuneration, because TVE 
workers do not have many social insurance benefits that urban employees might get (such 
as medical insurance, unemployment insurance, workers’ compensation coverage, or 
special funds to help them buy a home).  For example, by the end of 2002, the number of 
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PRC rural and small town workers with any rural social pension insurance was tiny 
(China NBS & Labour, 2003, pp. 575-581).  Table 7, in an attempt to capture the likely 
range of employee insurance and welfare benefits for TVE manufacturing employees, 
multiplies the average reported labor compensation by 1.00-1.16.  Estimated annual labor 
compensation for TVE manufacturing workers is therefore $837-$970, or PPP US$ 
3,890-4,513 in “international dollars.”  By any measure, China’s TVE workers get very 
low annual compensation.  It is important to note, however, that TVE employment is 
highly desirable to China’s rural workers because their TVE earnings are higher than they 
can derive from agriculture (Knight & Yueh, 2004).  
 
 To calculate the average annual TVE manufacturing labor compensation into a 
monthly wage is not easy because we do not know whether all or most of the reported 71 
million workers are year-round workers, and what proportion are part-year or part-time 
workers.  If this number represents full-time equivalents or means year-round workers, 
then their average monthly wage was US$ 70-81 at the official exchange rate, or 324-376 
international (PPP) dollars. 
 
 To adequately estimate the hourly wage of China’s TVE manufacturing 
employees would require data on the average number of days actually worked per year.  
In the absence of such information, any hourly compensation number is strictly 
hypothetical.  Let us make a set of such assumptions and see what the hourly wage of 
China’s TVE manufacturing workers would be under these assumptions.  For instance, 
just suppose (without any evidence) that China’s 71 million reported TVE manufacturing 
workers in 2002 worked year-round in their TVE jobs except for taking two weeks off for 
Chinese New Year (spring festival), two weeks for peak planting time twice a year 
(assuming double-cropping on average), two weeks for each of two peak harvest seasons, 
and a total of two weeks for all other needs such as illness, injury, family emergencies, 
personal leave, etc.  These assumptions are made because most TVE workers come from 
rural households still growing crops, and farm households tend to need all the labor they 
can get for planting and harvest.  Assume further that the rest of the time, TVE 
manufacturing workers put in about 50 hours of work per week.  This would total 2,000 
actual work hours per year for TVE manufacturing workers in 2002.  Based on these 
unsupported assumptions, the hourly labor compensation of China’s TVE manufacturing 
employees in 2002 would have been 3.46-4.02 yuan = US$ 0.42-0.49 at the official 
exchange rate = 1.95-2.26 international (PPP) dollars.  It is worth repeating that such 
numbers are mere guesswork based on the reported and adjusted annual labor 
compensation data, because we do not have information on the average number of hours 
worked in 2002 by China’s TVE manufacturing workers. 
 
 The above hypothetical calculation is for rural and town manufacturing workers 
in China.  Most TVE manufacturing employees produce only for China’s domestic 
market.  Nevertheless, many factories producing for the international market are 
classified as “rural” and these enterprises may also be called TVEs.  Millions of the low-
paid TVE workers produce products for export.  Already in 1990, TVEs as a group 
produced 13.5 percent of China’s GDP and 16 percent of PRC exports (Fox & Zhao, 
2002, p. 2).  As of 2002, a total of 151,000 TVEs reportedly produced 1,156 billion yuan 
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of exports out of China’s total exports of 2,695 billion yuan, or 43 percent.  Of the total 
of 13.4 million TVE employees producing for export in 2002, 10.7 million were working 
in 108,000 TVEs in only six provinces: Guangdong in the south, and the east coast 
provinces of Zhejiang, Jiangsu, Shanghai, Shandong, and Fujian (China Ministry of 
Agriculture, 2003, pp. 3, 129, 219).  Fully 91 percent of China’s exports are 
manufactured goods (China NBS, 2003, pp. 654-655).  Therefore it is safe to say that in 
value terms, PRC manufacturing TVEs produced more than one-third of China’s total 
2002 manufacturing exports. 
 
China’s exported manufacturing products also come from city manufacturing 
enterprises, especially from certain coastal regions of China.  Now let us estimate labor 
compensation for urban manufacturing workers. 
 
  2) Wages of Urban Manufacturing Workers in Dollars 
 
 Based on reported wage and labor compensation data only, China’s 30 million 
employees of urban manufacturing units had average 2002 labor compensation of 11,152 
yuan = US$ 1,347 at the official exchange rate = 6,263 international (PPP) dollars.  On 
the assumption that the data refer to full-time, year-round equivalents, the monthly urban 
manufacturing labor compensation is 929 yuan = US$ 112 at the official exchange rate = 
522 international (PPP) dollars. 
 
We do not have adequate data on the numbers of hours worked per year by urban 
manufacturing workers.  The only information so far located is that in the fourth quarter 
of 1998, a small sample of 138,000 manufacturing workers in urban state-owned 
enterprises in four large cities of China worked 489 actual hours, after accounting for lost 
work hours due to legal public holidays, down time (due to equipment repair, lack of raw 
materials, shortages of power, or no productive task to do), other non-productive work 
hours, sick leave, personal and family leave, occupational injury leave, and maternity 
leave (China NBS & Labour, 1999, pp. 629-630).  On the assumption that hours worked 
were the same in all four quarters of 1998, this would have been an average of 1,955 
hours worked per employee in the year.  Using the arbitrary assumption that this subset of 
urban manufacturing workers in late 1998 can roughly represent the annual working 
hours of China’s urban manufacturing workers in 2002, the following calculation 
assumes that urban manufacturing workers in the PRC average 1,955 hours of actual 
work time per year.  Based on that number of hours for 2002, China’s city manufacturing 
workers averaged 5.70 yuan per hour in reported “wage” or “labor compensation” = US$ 
0.69 at the official exchange rate = 3.20 international (PPP) dollars. 
 
 In the case of city workers, we need to add to their reported wage figures some 
estimate of the total social insurance funds payments paid to the government by the 
employers, which is not calculated into the wage or labor compensation data reported in 
Table 5.  The International Labour Office in Geneva, for example, reported that in China 
in 2002, 29.07 million urban manufacturing staff and workers earned an average wage of 
11,001 yuan per year (same as in this report in Table 5); assuming that these urban 
manufacturing staff and workers were full-time year-round employees, ILO calculated 
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the monthly average wage as (11,001 yuan / 12 months=) 916.75 yuan per month.  In 
order to get total labor cost per manufacturing worker for 2001 (2002 estimate was not 
given), ILO multiplied the reported annual average 2001 wage for urban manufacturing 
staff and workers by 1.5 (ILO, 2003, pp. 403, 1089, 1207). 
 
 China’s urban employers, including all urban manufacturing enterprises, are 
required by law to remit to the government every month a specified percent of their total 
wage bill (gongzi zonge) as the required employer contribution to the social insurance 
system and, in some cities, the home purchase fund (West, 1999, p. 165).  The amount 
varies from city to city.3  For example, in 2004, in addition to required contributions from 
employees that are included in their reported wages, enterprises in Changshu City of 
Jiangsu Province are required to pay 28 percent of their total staff and worker wage bill 
for the combined total of the old-age pension fund (16.5%), medical insurance fund (8%), 
unemployment insurance (2%), workers’ compensation insurance (0.6-0.8%), and 
maternity leave (1%) insurance (Changshu, 2004); enterprises in Wuxi City of Jiangsu 
Province have to pay 32 percent of their total wage bill for old-age pension (22%), 
medical (8%), and unemployment (2%) insurance (Wuxi, 2004); and manufacturing 
enterprises in Beijing Municipality are required to remit as the employer contribution a 
total of 39.5 percent of their total wage bill for a combination of the old-age pension fund 
(20%), medical insurance (9%), unemployment insurance (1.5%), workers’ compensation 
insurance (1% for manufacturing enterprises), and employee housing fund (8%).        
 
 Not only do the required employer contributions vary by municipality and city, 
but also the amounts have been increasing over time.  Therefore, it is likely that the 
legally required employer contribution to the social insurance funds for the average 
manufacturing employee in 2002 was lower than it is now. 
 
 We need to know the overall percent of the total wage bill that urban 
manufacturing employers were required to pay and did pay in 2002 for social insurance 
and required housing fund payments, in order to adjust the reported manufacturing wage 
to include legally required employer social insurance payments.  China’s Ministry of 
Labour and Social Security conducted a survey of 11,704 urban enterprises in 51 large 
and medium-sized cities all over China, and collected from these organizations all 
relevant worker compensation data for the year 2002.  (All data in this paragraph are 
from China Ministry of Labour and Social Security, 2004, p. 379.)   This report uses the 
results of that large survey to estimate a range for average labor compensation costs in 
urban manufacturing above and beyond the reported wage data for 2002 given in Tables 
5 and 7.  Survey results showed that urban manufacturing enterprises paid to authorities 
                                                 
3 In some cities, the social benefit payment that the enterprise is required to pay the government is not 
strictly a percent of whatever the total gross salary bill is.  For example in Shanghai for 2003, enterprises 
had to pay 43.5 percent of the total wage bill, subject to the following constraints: if the reported total wage 
bill divided by the reported number of employees averaged less than 60 percent of Shanghai’s average 
monthly salary for the first half of 2003, the enterprise still had to pay 43.5 percent of that minimum salary 
threshold.  The maximum payment the enterprise was required to remit was 43.5 percent of the total wage 
bill that would represent 3 times the average 2003 Shanghai wage (Zhang, 2004, p. 10).  This procedure is 
supposed to be applied nationwide, based on State Council Document Number 6 (West & Goodkind, 1999, 
p. 3). 
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in 2002 an average of 28 percent of their average reported wage for social insurance and 
4 percent of the average wage for the municipal housing fund, totaling 32 percent of their 
average wage per employee for social insurance and housing fund payments.  This author 
will use that percent as the low estimate of legally mandated social welfare payments 
paid by China’s urban manufacturing enterprises in 2002.  The same survey also reported 
that total average labor cost was 1.58 times the average wage for urban manufacturing 
enterprises.  The enterprise labor costs included wages, social insurance and housing fund 
payments paid by employers to government, employee welfare costs (fuli feiyong), 
education or training costs, worker protection costs, and unspecified other labor-related 
costs.  The welfare costs were 12 percent of the average wage.  This employee welfare 
fund is used for reimbursements and subsidies that are not reported in the wage data (see 
Glossary and Definitions: Welfare fund).  Using these survey data, this author’s high 
estimate of average 2002 urban manufacturing employer labor compensation costs above 
and beyond reported wages is 58 percent of the average wage. 
 
 Table 7 estimates that PRC urban manufacturing employees received an average 
of about US$ 2,000 in annual labor compensation for 2002, while TVE manufacturing 
employees got less than US$ 1,000.  Monthly labor compensation for urban 
manufacturing employees was well under US$ 200, and for TVE manufacturing 
employees, considerably less than US$ 100.  Using arbitrary estimates of hours worked 
per year by manufacturing workers in cities and in towns and rural areas, this paper 
produces rough estimates of hourly labor compensation for manufacturing workers in 
China.  Employees of urban manufacturing units got about US$ 0.90-1.10 per hour, and 
TVE (town and village) manufacturing employees less than US$ 0.50 per hour of work. 
 
 Ignoring the lack of reported wage data for self-employed individuals and small 
urban privately-owned manufacturing operations in the cities, this paper combines labor 
compensation estimates for the reported 71 million TVE manufacturing employees and 
the 30 million manufacturing employees of urban units to derive a rough range of 
estimates for annual, monthly, and hourly labor compensation in PRC manufacturing.  As 
shown in Table 7, these 100.6 million China manufacturing employees received in 2002 
approximately US$ 1,100-1,300 in labor compensation, which works out to about 
US$ 90-110 in monthly labor compensation, and implies hourly labor compensation of 
around US$ 0.56-0.67 for PRC manufacturing employees.4 
 
 This procedure of combining adjusted reported annual TVE and urban 
manufacturing wages turns out to be reasonably consistent with PRC national accounts.  
Estimated employee remuneration in Table 7 for “All China manufacturing urban units 
and TVEs” gives an unadjusted national manufacturing wage of 8,186 yuan per year on 
average, and total labor compensation per employee in 2002 of 9,250-10,892 yuan, which 
is 1.13-1.33 times the unadjusted wage.  PRC national accounts are not yet published for 
2002, but the 2000 China input-output table is published.  For the year 2000, the flow of 
funds table of the PRC input-output table showed that non-financial enterprises paid 14.7 
percent of the total wage bill (gongzi ji gongzixing shouru) in social insurance payments 
(danwei shehui baoxian fukuan).  The total wage bill and employer social insurance 
                                                 
4 Employment weights are used to calculate an estimate of the national manufacturing wage.  
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payments were added together to derive the total labor compensation (laodongzhe 
baochou) for non-financial enterprises in 2000 (China NBS, 2003, p. 84).  This input-
output table refers to China as a whole.  The 2002 PRC input-output table will 
presumably show that employer social insurance payments were a higher percent of the 
total wage bill than the 15 percent figure for 2000, because every year the mandated 
employer social insurance payments are increasing, at least in the cities and probably 
outside the cities as well.  
 
 Table 7 also derives estimates of annual, monthly, and hourly labor compensation 
for China’s national, urban, and village and town manufacturing employees in 
international purchasing power parity dollars.  These PPP figures give us a feel for the 
purchasing power of the overall compensation of China’s manufacturing employees—
urban manufacturing workers in China are getting income and benefits that US$ 4-5 per 
hour in overall compensation would get them in the U.S., while PRC rural and town 
manufacturing workers receive what US$ 2 in labor compensation would buy in the U.S.  
Overall equivalent buying power of labor compensation for China’s manufacturing 
workers is about US$ 3.  
 
 C. Key Export Regions: Manufacturing Labor Compensation 
 
 Many parts of China engage in manufacturing that is part of global trade.  These 
manufacturing enterprises import enormous quantities of components, inputs, raw 
materials, and machinery for their production, primarily from other Asian countries, and 
they employ large numbers of non-PRC managers and professionals.  They export some 
of their final product to the global market, chiefly to the United States, Europe, and 
developed countries in Asia (Lardy, 2003).  The two leading manufacturing regions 
producing for the global market today are the Pearl River (Zhujiang) Delta (near Hong 
Kong and Macao) of Guangdong Province, which includes 9 cities, and the Yangtze 
River (Changjiang) Delta that includes 15 cities in Shanghai Municipality, Zhejiang 
Province, and the southern half of Jiangsu Province (Wu, 2004).  Both areas include 
many non-city manufacturing centers. 
 
China’s urban manufacturing wage statistics are reported by province.  Using 
those data, we approximate urban manufacturing labor compensation for the leading 
export centers in Table 8.  The top half of the table uses reported earnings of urban 
manufacturing workers without adjustment, and the lower section of the table uses the 
same range of multipliers as for urban manufacturing workers in Table 7, 1.32-1.58, to 
derive annual, monthly, and hourly labor compensation for the city manufacturing 
workers of these four leading provinces in China’s manufacturing import and export 
trade. 
   
 The three provinces of the Yangtze River Delta have a wide range of urban 
manufacturing wages and labor compensation.  As shown in Table 8, Shanghai’s 1.3 
million city manufacturing workers are comparatively highly paid.  Their 2002 labor 
compensation averaged about US$ 3,500-4,200, and hourly compensation was 
approximately US$ 2.  Zhejiang’s 1 million and Jiangsu’s 2.3 million urban 
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manufacturing workers had much lower labor compensation than Shanghai, but still 
higher than the national average shown in Table 7. 
 
 The total 2002 employment in urban manufacturing units in Guangdong Province 
as a whole averaged 2.6 million manufacturing workers with reported 2002 labor 
compensation averaging almost 15,000 yuan (Table 8).  After adjustments to include 
other labor compensation costs, Guangdong’s city manufacturing workers received labor 
compensation of US$ 2,400-2,900 for 2002, which was about US$ 200-240 per month 
and US$ 1.20-1.50 per hour. 
 
 These city manufacturing wage statistics for China’s leading export 
manufacturing regions are woefully inadequate for providing a true picture of the wages 
paid by manufacturing enterprises in those provinces.  No wage data at all are reported 
for the so-called “rural” manufacturing workers by province.  At yearend 2002, based on 
the National Bureau of Statistics and Labour Ministry compilation, rural manufacturing 
employees totaled 1.09 million in Shanghai Municipality, 5.82 million in Zhejiang 
Province, 4.61 million in Jiangsu Province, and 4.25 million in Guangdong Province 
(China NBS & Labour, 2003, p. 26).  If the Agriculture Ministry reported the numbers of 
TVE manufacturing workers by province, the numbers of TVE manufacturing employees 
for these four provinces would undoubtedly be much higher than the reported numbers of 
rural manufacturing employees there.  
 
 The only useful reported wage statistics that are relevant to non-city 
manufacturing workers and are available by province are for TVE industry (gongye) 
employees.  For the PRC as a whole, the average TVE manufacturing labor compensation 
for 2002 was 6,927 yuan, as shown in Tables 5 and 7.  These manufacturing workers 
constituted 92.4 percent of TVE industry workers nationwide.  For China as a whole, the 
average 2002 TVE industry employee labor compensation was 6,891 yuan (China 
Ministry of Agriculture, 2003, pp. 130-131; China NBS & Labour, 2003, p. 473).  Since 
the national TVE manufacturing wage was only 0.5 percent higher than the national TVE 
industry wage, we can use 2002 data by province for the latter to roughly estimate the 
former. 
 
 Table 9 reports 2002 TVE industry labor compensation for the two leading export 
manufacturing regions.  These data show that TVE industry workers have higher incomes 
in the Yangtze Delta provinces and Guangdong Province than the average TVE industry 
wage for the country.  Shanghai and Zhejiang TVE industry employees were the highest 
paid—US$ 0.72-0.84 per hour in the Shanghai suburban and rural areas, and US$ 0.62-
0.71 an hour in Zhejiang Province’s rural and industrial zones outside its cities.  Non-city 
industry workers in Jiangsu and Guangdong Provinces were not as well paid—just US$ 
0.50-0.58 per hour in Guangdong and US$ 0.49-0.57 in Jiangsu. 
 
 These four provinces have thriving manufacturing zones focused on the world 
market.  If their TVE manufacturing workers constitute about 92.4 percent of their TVE 
industry workers, then these four provinces have approximately the following numbers of 
manufacturing workers outside their cities: Shanghai: 1.50 million; Zhejiang: 8.00 
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million; Jiangsu: 6.96 million; and Guangdong: 7.61 million.  These numbers are far 
greater than the numbers of rural manufacturing workers reported by the NBS and 
Ministry of Labour for those provinces. 
 
Underreporting of Manufacturing Employment and Wages in China 
  
China’s people and work units were unaccustomed to paying income taxes, value-
added taxes, corporate income taxes, or high payments for social insurance during the 
Maoist decades.  The government extracted the money for its budget in other ways, but 
they were not so visible as these taxes are now.  Individuals got benefits in both urban 
and rural areas while wages were kept very low.  Today during the reform era, people 
would rather not pay taxes on their still-modest incomes, or at least would prefer to keep 
their payments low.  Employers, meanwhile, have a culture of massive tax avoidance 
(Dow Jones, 2004).  For example, when foreign and multinational companies come to 
China and attempt to set up a joint venture with a (usually state-owned) Chinese 
company, or arrange a merger with or acquisition of a PRC company, the foreign 
company must engage in a due diligence process to determine whether the joint venture, 
merger or acquisition is in the interests of its owners and shareholders.  The auditors and 
accounting companies frequently discover that the target company has two sets of books:  
“Most domestic enterprises keep separate sets of ‘management accounts’ and ‘tax 
accounts’ ” (Woodard & Wang, forthcoming 2005).  The “tax ledger” is the set of 
employee and financial data reported to the tax and other authorities, and the 
“administrative ledger” records a more accurate picture of the numbers of employees, 
their actual remuneration, the true costs and income of the company, its actual profits, 
etc.  The “tax ledger” is designed to minimize tax exposure, particularly corporate 
income tax, value-added tax, personal income tax for employer as well as employees, and 
required social benefit payments.  It is believed that non-public sector domestic Chinese 
enterprises avoid taxation and social benefit payments to an even greater extent than the 
state-owned and collective-owned enterprises. 
 
 Such tax avoidance in the manufacturing sector probably has the following 
implications (see also Fox & Zhao, 2002).  First, many urban employees, especially those 
who are in-migrants and do not have city residence permits, or those who are temporary 
or part-time workers, are sometimes left off the books entirely, at least with regard to 
what is reported to authorities.  The employment is kept informal, and neither the 
employee nor his wages, which are paid in cash, are reported.  This means that the 
employee can avoid paying income tax and any required deductions from his pay, while 
the employer can avoid paying the required social insurance payments for any unreported 
employees.  This may mean that actual manufacturing employment numbers are 
underreported in PRC statistics, especially the urban figures. 
 
 Second, even when employees are reported to authorities, both employer and 
employees tend to collude to minimize the reported “wage” or “labor compensation.” 
Employers in urban areas are required to remit to the city government social insurance 
and other payments that are calculated as a percent of the unit’s total wage or labor 
compensation bill as reported.  These required payments have been increasing rapidly 
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and are high by international standards: “High contribution rates are leading to high rates 
of evasion in the basic pension system” as well as other required social welfare payments 
(Jackson & Howe, 2004, p. 14).  Many employers might perceive that these required 
payments are squeezing their profits and are burdensome; they might therefore have an 
incentive to underreport wages.  Some of the money actually given to employees (as 
bonuses or overtime pay or financial subsidies of various kinds) may not be reported as 
wage.  Some of it gets shifted to the welfare fund (fuli fei) category or other unspecified 
labor-related cost category, which is why it is important to include these labor cost 
categories in a realistic estimate of urban manufacturing labor compensation in the PRC.  
It is also likely that many PRC urban enterprises underreport or leave out of reported 
wages or reported labor compensation the value of some benefits provided in kind to 
employees (meals, housing, transport, food distributions).  Therefore, it is very likely that 
urban wages and labor compensation in the PRC are systematically underreported for 
those employees whose employment is reported to authorities. 
 
 Those employees not reported to the authorities at all are usually paid very low 
wages.  The going rate in non-agricultural work for an unskilled rural worker in the PRC 
today is 500-600 yuan per month, plus whatever minimum benefits are essential to 
provide, such as simple meals and dormitories and emergency medical assistance.  Some 
rural workers are paid as little as 300 yuan per month, while more desirable workers 
might get as much as 800 yuan monthly.  If these unreported workers in the 
manufacturing sector average cash pay of 550 yuan per month, and if their simple 
accommodations and food cost another 200 yuan per month, then their labor 
compensation is 750 yuan = US$ 91 per month, but only when they are actually working.  
If for 3 months of the year they are planting and harvesting and celebrating and taking 
care of personal business and illness, then their annual take-home cash plus basic benefits 
would be 6,750 yuan per year, and if they work 2000 hours in a year then hourly pay 
works out to 3.38 yuan or US$ 0.41.  This estimate is close to the reported data that gives 
us a wage of 6,927 yuan for TVE manufacturing workers in 2002. 
 
Migrant Manufacturing Workers 
 
Where are the migrant manufacturing workers in PRC statistics?  Most published 
data on manufacturing employment and wages do not single out migrants.  Therefore it is 
difficult to discover how many migrant manufacturing workers there are, where they are, 
and what they are paid.  In theory, if a worker has migrated from a village to a city and is 
employed in a manufacturing enterprise, the employer should report the migrant’s job 
and wage in the “manufacturing staff and worker” category.  But in most cities of China, 
migrants who do not possess city permanent residence documents are apparently, in 
practice, not eligible for urban social insurance and housing benefits: 
 
Contracted rural migrant laborers are supposed to be covered [in the social basic 
pension system] as well. While the inclusion of rural migrant labour in urban 
areas would also reduce the dependency ratio because of the concentration of 
migrant labourers in the young working age groups, present weaknesses in 
administrative capacity make it questionable whether these workers will ever 
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draw benefits, especially if they return to rural areas or move on to other urban 
areas.  In some cases, the pension contribution is simply an added tax from which 
the migrant will derive no benefits (West, 1999, p. 172). 
 
In principle rural migrants and other contract workers who work in urban 
enterprises should have social insurance coverage.  In fact, enforcement is weak.  
As rural migrants have few legal rights, they do not report this abuse.  In addition, 
given their uncertain length of tenure in the area, they face a risk of not getting 
benefits due.  These groups may prefer higher wages over a tenuous insurance 
contract (Fox & Zhao, 2002, p. 37).  
 
There is increasing informal evidence that published urban wage data exclude the 
pay of migrant workers (Rawski, personal communication).  It is not clear whether urban 
manufacturing enterprises actually report their migrant employee numbers and wages, 
and then these data are left out of the urban statistics, or whether information on the 
migrant manufacturing workers is not even reported.     
 
  Many millions of young rural workers have migrated to China’s export 
manufacturing zones in the most recent decade and a half to work in factories.  
Sometimes these factories are within city administrative boundaries, but often they are 
located in industrial parks, suburban areas, built-up peri-urban industrial zones, towns, or 
rural regions where agricultural land is being taken over for manufacturing zones.  Both 
foreign and domestic employers eager to keep down their labor costs may prefer that their 
export processing factories be classified as rural and/or TVE (Fox & Zhao, 2002).  In this 
case, they are confronted with few or no requirements to pay social insurance and other 
welfare payments for their hundreds or thousands of production and hand-assembly 
workers, and at the same time statistical reporting requirements for their enterprises are 
minimal.  Many of the migrant manufacturing workers in these factories may be counted 
in the PRC “rural” manufacturing employment figures and/or the TVE manufacturing 
industry employment numbers (see Table 2).  However, it is possible that hundreds of 
thousands or even millions of migrant manufacturing workers working in cities or outside 
cities are not reported in any of the annual administrative statistics, because employer and 
employee are jointly avoiding taxes.  
 
China 2002 Manufacturing Labor Compensation—Best Guess Scenario 
 
 As this report has demonstrated, the PRC has not collected and published enough 
detailed information and statistics to justify derivation of solid figures on hourly labor 
compensation in manufacturing.  Therefore, to illustrate the levels of uncertainty with 
which this analysis must cope, the author has presented a range for each estimate in 
Tables 7, 8, and 9.   
 
 Nevertheless, in order to simplify discussion and serve the needs of BLS, this 
report presents best guess estimates in Table 10.  This author’s best guess multiplier for 
urban manufacturing workers is 1.538 for 2002.  That is, the reported 2002 annual wage 
or earnings should be multiplied by 1.538 to include the following labor compensation 
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costs to the employers:  required employer social insurance payments to the government, 
28 percent of the wage; required housing fund payments, 4 percent of the wage; 
employee welfare costs paid by the employer to or for employees in addition to those 
included in the wage, 12 percent of reported wage; and other labor-related costs not 
specified in detail, 10 percent of the wage (China Ministry of Labour & Social Security, 
2004, p. 379).  This multiplier leaves out employee education and training costs and 
worker protection and safety costs because BLS does not normally include these costs in 
its international comparative estimates of hourly labor compensation in manufacturing.  
In the Chinese case, it is probably wise to include in labor compensation the amorphous, 
vaguely reported categories of welfare costs and other unspecified labor-related costs 
because of the likely biases in the basic wage and earnings data.  To minimize individual 
and corporate taxes and required social insurance payments, urban employers tend to 
underreport wages to the extent possible, neglecting to include some in-kind benefits in 
the reported wage and off-loading as many employee subsidies and benefits as possible 
onto the fuli feiyong (welfare fund costs) category or “other” labor compensation 
category.   
 
 This author has no better information than previously presented on the true social 
insurance benefits and other labor compensation costs not included in reported TVE 
manufacturing wages but given to or remitted to governments on behalf of employees.  
So far this multiplier has been estimated in the range 1.00-1.16, so for a best guess 
scenario this author just takes the average and uses 1.08 as the best guess multiplier for 
TVEs in Table 10. 
 
 Best guess estimation procedures result in these conclusions (Table 10): 
 
--China’s manufacturing workers earn less than $1,300 per year on average, if the 
calculation is based on commercial exchange rates.  Urban manufacturing 
employees get average annual labor compensation of about $2,100, more than 
twice the figure of $900 for TVE manufacturing workers who work mostly 
outside the cities. 
 
--PRC manufacturing employees receive labor compensation of approximately 
$0.63 per hour.  Urban manufacturing workers get about $1.06 an hour, while 
TVE manufacturing employees average only $0.45 per hour. 
 
--Using purchasing power parity exchange rates, China’s manufacturing workers 
get average labor compensation that would buy the equivalent of what almost $3 
an hour in the US would purchase.  Urban Chinese manufacturing employees 
approach $5 per hour in international PPP dollars, but TVE manufacturing 
workers get only a little over $2 in international purchasing power. 
 
Time Series of Manufacturing Wages for China, 1990-2002 
 
 One of the many goals of this project is to derive a time series of hourly 
manufacturing labor compensation for the PRC for the period 1990-2002, if possible.  If 
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it is not possible to present such a series for all manufacturing employees in China, then a 
time series of real wages of some sub-group of PRC manufacturing workers would still 
be useful. 
 
 This author has shown that it is a major challenge just to estimate hourly 
manufacturing labor compensation for China in one recent year.  The only reasons that 
this is even possible for the year 2002 are: 
 
a) For the year 2002, the Agriculture Ministry released for the first time figures on 
the total number of China TVE manufacturing workers and the total amount of 
labor compensation paid out to them during the year. 
b) The Labour Ministry carried out a large survey of city enterprises for the year 
2002 and published a book that included data on labor costs in urban 
manufacturing units above and beyond reported wages (see Glossary and 
Definitions: China labor force market wage survey”). 
c) This author, after much searching, was fortunate to even locate the above volumes 
of information, but has not found such information for prior years. 
 
Because these data are not available for previous years, the creation of a defensible time 
series of manufacturing wages in China for 1990-2002 is probably not possible. 
  
The only information this author has located on time trends of manufacturing 
wages in China refer to urban manufacturing staff and workers.  Table 11 presents the 
published information on indices of average real wages.  Real living standards have been 
rising in PRC cities, and real wages have been rising for urban staff and workers in 
manufacturing (see also Lardy, 2004a).  The urban “staff and worker” component of 
urban manufacturing workers is theoretically supposed to include manufacturing workers 
who migrated into cities from rural areas, but the rising wages indicated in Table 11 
probably exclude data on wages of rural-to-urban migrant manufacturing workers 
(Rawski, personal communication; Fox & Zhao, 2002, p. 3, 22).  Urban manufacturing 
wages rose rapidly in the early 1990s, rose slowly in the mid-1990s, and increased very 
fast at the end of the 1990s and in the early 21st century.  Table 11 shows that these 
generalizations about city manufacturing wage trends also hold for manufacturing 
employees in state-owned units, collective-owned units, and “other” ownership units 
(joint ventures, foreign-owned, multinational, etc.). 
 
Table 12 and Figure 4 present trends in real annual wages (not including required 
employer payments for social insurance schemes or other non-wage labor costs) for urban 
manufacturing staff and workers in China.  In 1990, the 53 million urban manufacturing 
staff and workers earned an average of 5,058 yuan (in constant 2002 yuan).  As the total 
numbers of urban manufacturing staff and workers shrank to 29 million in 2002, the 
average wage of those remaining was 11,001 yuan, more than double the 1990 average 
wage.  There was a shift in composition of the urban manufacturing staff and workers 
category in these 13 years (Table 2).  In 1990 the lowest-paid subgroup, urban collective 
manufacturing workers, was large (18 million) and helped hold down the average real 
wage, while the highest paid subgroup, private sector enterprises, was tiny.  By 2002, the 
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highest paid subgroup constituted more than half of urban manufacturing staff and 
workers.  This trend toward the better-paid private sector raised the average wage among 
urban staff and workers in manufacturing. 
 
Hours Worked in Manufacturing—The Key Missing Statistic 
 
 China reports manufacturing employment numbers and average wages on an 
annual basis.  These annual numbers for 2002 appear to be rough but usable.  Annual 
labor compensation figures so derived are reasonably consistent with reports from visits, 
interviews, and investigations in China’s factories.  The major weakness in this report is 
the attempt to move from annual data to hourly figures for average labor compensation in 
manufacturing.  The problem is that, as far as this author has been able to determine, the 
PRC has published essentially no data on average number of hours worked per year in 
manufacturing production for urban or rural factories. 
 
 It is possible that in this report the author has estimated too low for the numbers 
of hours worked on average per year by manufacturing employees in city and non-city 
factories.  Some investigations in China’s export zones in Guangdong and other coastal 
provinces have discovered many factories in which the employees typically work the 
entire year with only a two-week holiday at Chinese New Year.  In many such export-
oriented factories, employees usually work 6 or 7 days each week, totaling 60-80 hours 
per week in peak season for that manufacturing sub-sector, which can be up to 8 months 
a year (Verite, 2004; Chang, 2004).   Average yearly hours actually worked per employee 
might be as high as 4,000 hours in some China manufacturing enterprises.  In those hard-
driving Guangdong factories, suppose that in 2002 the average urban wage was 14,958 
yuan as reported in Table 8, and suppose that we must increase the urban wage by 54 
percent to include all employer social insurance payments, welfare costs, and other labor 
costs, giving us average annual labor compensation of 23,035 yuan or $2,782.  If 
employees in 2002 worked 4,000 hours for that income, it worked out to $0.70 per hour 
for the manufacturing workers in those city factories.  Outside Guangdong’s cities, 
reported 2002 average wage was 8,345 yuan (Table 9).  Increasing this figure by 8 
percent to adjust for employer social insurance payments, total average 2002 labor 
compensation was 9,013 yuan or $1,088.  For those factories whose workers put in 4,000 
hours of production work in that year, per hour average labor compensation was only 
$0.27.  This illustration emphasizes why it is very important to determine what is the 
actual average number of hours worked in each year for city and for TVE manufacturing 
employees. 
 
 Data from China’s 2000 census confirm that, generally speaking, manufacturing 
employees in the PRC work a lengthy week; at least they did during the last week of 
October of the year 2000.  From the census, of 88 million manufacturing workers in 
China, 58 percent had worked 6 or 7 days in the previous week.  But if the census 
counted tens of millions of part-year, seasonal manufacturing workers from rural areas 
and small towns as farmers, those rural (probably called TVE) manufacturing workers 
would put in far fewer hours in manufacturing per year than those working year round in 
coastal zone factories.    
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 In the case of the PRC, it is not acceptable to use legal limits on working hours or 
overtime hours to estimate actual hours worked.  Factories routinely report that they are 
abiding by the regulations when in fact employees are working more hours per day, and 
many more hours per week or month than the statutory limits.  One purpose of the very 
widespread double bookkeeping in China’s factories is to report compliance with laws on 
minimum wages and maximum permissible overtime hours when in fact the factory 
routinely violates the laws.  Factories frequently keep two sets of payroll records, one set 
to present to the social auditors (government authorities, investigators sent by overseas 
buyers to check compliance with labor laws, etc.) and the other to use for internal 
bookkeeping (Verite, 2004).  Generally speaking, grass-roots investigators report that the 
factories do not misreport the total wage paid per month or per day to the employees; 
rather, they grossly underreport the hours worked to earn that income. 
 
 Of China’s reported 70.9 million TVE manufacturing employees in 2002, only 
13.4 million were reported to be producing for export, while 57.5 million were apparently 
producing only for the domestic market.  An adequate estimate of average annual hours 
worked in TVE manufacturing must take account of both these categories of non-city 
manufacturing workers.     
      
Is China’s Labor Supply “Inexhaustible”? 
 
 The PRC is widely perceived to have an unending supply of poor laborers willing 
to work for extraordinarily low wages: 
 
Right now China is, in many ways, the centripetal force of globalization—
attracting capital and companies at an increasing rate; in the process, given its 
inexhaustible supply of cheap labor and surprisingly swift ascent up the 
technological food chain, it is rewriting the economics of scores of industries 
(Powell, 2001).      
 
 One reason that China still pays very low compensation to manufacturing laborers 
by international standards is that the vast size of its current surplus labor force dampens 
forces that tend to raise wages.  Rawski, for example, refers to “China’s growing 
problems of unemployment and excess labour supply” (Rawski, 2003, p. 1).  How big is 
China’s surplus labor force and what are the characteristics of these adults?  Are they 
suitable and readily available to work in China’s manufacturing industries, or not? 
 
 The PRC has sustained massive layoffs in its urban state-owned and collective 
manufacturing industries, as indicated by the sharp declines in their employment numbers 
in Table 2.  “The shutdown of inefficient state-owned plants has cost China tens of 
millions of jobs, with more to go” (Forney, 2004, p. 34).  In addition, government 
employment has been steeply cut in recent years.  The outcome is that in China’s urban 
areas, the unemployed and laid-off workers may be about 6-13 percent of the 
economically active population (Hu, 1998; Rawski, 2003; Cai, 2004; Knight & Xue, 
2004; Knight & Yueh, 2004; Economist, 2004a, p. 27), with some estimates of the true 
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unemployment rate rising to 25 percent as some scholars attempt to include disguised 
unemployment (Chen & Coulson, 2002, p. 2193).  In China’s rust belt in the northeast, 
some cities are estimated to have actual unemployment rates approaching 40 percent of 
the labor force.  China’s urban surplus workers include millions of middle-aged and older 
formerly employed workers who may or may not be suitable for the required work in 
manufacturing.  Many have been forced to retire early, have left the labor force, and have 
lost heart, so they cease looking for work (Yang, 2003, p. 265; Cai & Wang, 2004, p. 79).  
Some never even tried to look for work because they feel that whatever might be 
available is beneath them.  But there are also millions of young adults with a senior high 
school or equivalent level of education who are looking for their first or second job.  This 
is a large pool of potential employees who are already in the cities.     
 
 The surplus labor force in China’s countryside is variously estimated in a huge 
range of 100-200 million (Economist, 2004a, p. 28).  For example, “The unemployment 
rate in urban areas is estimated at more than 8 percent; there may be an additional 200 
million jobless workers in the countryside” (Hale & Hale, 2003).  According to some 
surveys, nearly a third of today’s rural labor force is surplus agricultural workers (Cai et 
al., 2002, p. 321; Knight & Xue, 2004, p. 2).  As agriculture modernizes in China during 
the coming decades, hundreds of millions of agricultural workers will need other kinds of 
employment (McGuckin & Spiegelman, 2004, p. 27). 
 
Chinese manufacturers have access to an almost unlimited supply of cheap labour.  
By some estimates, there are almost 200m underemployed workers in rural areas 
that could move into industry.  This surplus labour may take at least two decades 
to absorb, helping to hold down wages for low-skilled workers (who currently 
earn less than 50 cents an hour)….Although average real wages in Chinese 
manufacturing have increased quite briskly over the past decade, the main 
beneficiaries have been skilled rather than unskilled workers (Economist, 2004c).     
 
 Are China’s potential manufacturing employees willing to move from the village, 
town, or city where they are to wherever there are jobs?  In general, the answer appears to 
be yes: 
 
Now [in China] people are concerned with…can I find a higher paying job, can I 
move to a different place to get better opportunities?  Seven years ago, people 
were concerned about getting opportunities from where they were.  Now they are 
increasingly asking ‘Can I move somewhere else, from the countryside to the city 
or from this province to another province?  And if I am trained properly, can I 
compete for better jobs and how do I compete?’  [Interview with World Bank 
China Programme Director Yukon Huang] (Xu, 2004).  
 
 There are increasing numbers of reports that manufacturing and other industries in 
the Pearl River Delta (PRD) or other parts of Guangdong Province are experiencing labor 
shortages in the most recent several years.  Fujian and Zhejiang provinces have also been 
affected.  The main reasons for these shortages of manufacturing workers in the booming 
coastal provinces are: 
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--Continuing hidden barriers to migration, including lack of social security and 
health care for migrants and inability to get urban residence registration 
(Economist, 2004e).  Policies that continue to dampen labor mobility are keeping 
China’s labor markets segmented (Fox & Zhao, 2002, pp. 1-5, 25, 30-38).  
 
--In 2004, rural incomes appear to be rising in some areas that normally supply 
low-paid manufacturing labor to PRD factories, inducing some potential migrants 
to decide they are better off staying in the countryside nearer their homes 
(Economist, 2004a, p. 28).  Grain prices and agricultural subsidies have increased, 
making agricultural work more attractive than before (Fong, 2004, p. B1). 
 
--Flat and extremely low pay rates and poor working conditions in PRD factories, 
which make them less attractive to migrants than east coast factories that pay 
more and have begun to improve benefits (Fong, 2004, p. B1; Goodman, 2004).  
 
--Objectionable practices, such as routine withholding of months of wages by 
manufacturing employers in order to prevent workers from leaving the factories, 
are becoming widely known among former, current, and potential migrant 
laborers, who are realizing that they will not be paid what they are promised.  
Therefore, fewer workers are willing to migrate, especially to the PRD.  The PRC 
government has passed a new law effective December 1, 2004, to force employers 
to pay all wages owed and pay on time (Washington Times, 2004).  
 
These labor shortages will presumably be solved by policy changes to make migration 
more desirable and feasible for rural workers, as well as rising wages and improved 
working conditions in China’s manufacturing enterprises.  Trade and non-trade barriers 
between China’s provinces need to be eliminated in order to free up the movement of 
labor: “While Guangdong’s factories are thought to be as much as 2 million workers 
short, the inland provinces have cheap labour in abundance” (Economist, 2004f). 
 
 What about the coming decade or two?  Will China run out of people willing to 
work in manufacturing for a low wage by international standards?  It is true that the PRC 
had a steep fall in fertility during the 1970s, when China implemented its forceful family 
planning program in rural areas and then its one-child policy.  Since then during most 
years, fertility in China has been extraordinarily low by developing country standards.  
Cohorts of children born from the late 1970s to the late 1980s have already entered labor 
force ages.  China’s cities in particular have comparatively small cohorts of young adults 
because of the success of the one-child policy in cities.  So analysts might speculate that 
China will soon experience shortages of young adult workers, especially in urban areas 
but nationally as well. 
 
 Countering this demographic trend, however, is the massive legacy of surplus 
labor in China’s rural and urban economies that will continue to be felt for some time: 
“…a sizable surplus of labor still exists in the rural sector (about 150 million) and state-
owned enterprises (about 10-11 million)” (Brooks & Tao, 2003, pp. 1-3).  If there are 
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shortages of city-born young adult workers in some economically booming cities, 
employers can find eager workers from the vast countryside who can be trained to do 
most of the jobs, even if their education had stopped after junior middle school.  Now and 
in the coming decades, urban China can draw on rural-to-urban migrants to fill gaps 
between urban demand for labor and urban-born supply of labor (Knight & Xue, 2004, p. 
18; Knight & Yueh, 2004).  “Up to 500 million peasants are expected to migrate to cities 
in search of factory work over the next two decades” (Forney, 2004, p. 34).  Not only 
that, but productivity in China’s manufacturing industries will continue to rise, which will 
require fewer employees for the same output.  China’s massive pool of rural labor 
needing modern jobs is expected to continue to depress manufacturing wages in the PRC: 
 
The United Nations estimates that some 200 million people will move from 
China’s rural areas to cities between 2000 and 2010.  Even assuming labor 
demand from China’s factories keeps growing rapidly, there is an almost infinite 
supply of workers to fill it.  That means wages will likely remain low, and 
employers will have little incentive to listen to complaints about working 
conditions (Dolven, 2003). 
 
Therefore, for the first decades of the 21st century, the PRC has for all practical purposes 
an unlimited supply of labor, at least of the unskilled and minimally educated variety, and 
perhaps also of basically literate and numerate hard-working laborers who were born in 
the countryside.    
 
Comparisons of Estimates of Manufacturing Employee Compensation in China 
 
 Many media and other sources around the world have published very rough 
estimates of hourly or monthly wages or compensation for manufacturing workers in 
China.  Let us compare their estimates with those in this report: 
 
With manufacturing wages in China averaging about 60 cents an hour—5% of the 
American average, and 10% of that in some neighboring Asian economies—and a 
seemingly infinite supply of workers, China does look as though it could out-
compete other economies in the manufacturing of almost anything labour-
intensive.  And this is exactly what is happening: 70% of China’s exports today 
are of garments, toys, shoes, furniture and such like...China is already by far the 
biggest garment exporter in the world, with average wages in the industry of 40 
cents an hour—less than a third of, say, Mexico’s (Economist, 2003). 
 
Typically, a U.S. or Western European factory worker costs an employer $15 to 
$30 per hour.  A Chinese factory worker earns the equivalent of less than $1 per 
hour (Stalk & Young, 2004). 
 
Both GM and Ford acknowledge that Chinese auto-parts suppliers now serve as 
global “benchmark” prices for quality and price on certain components….The 
prices reflect China’s average wage costs of 90 cents an hour, compared with 
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$22.50 in the U.S., according to Roland Berger Strategy Consultants of Troy, 
Michigan (Shirouzu, 2004, p. A5) 
 
The best estimates are that workers employed [in China] by the big, global 
automakers make the equivalent of $1.50 per hour in wages and benefits 
(Szczesny, 2004). 
 
[Regarding wages in China’s electronics manufacturing industry]:  In China, there 
are multitudes of people eager to work for wages as low as $130 a 
month…(Ramstad, 2004). 
 
 The above estimates of manufacturing wages or labor compensation in China are 
all in the ballpark.  Table 7 derived an all-China labor compensation estimate of US$ 
0.56-0.67 for PRC manufacturing workers, and Table 10 derived a best-guess estimate of 
$0.63; therefore a figure of 60 cents an hour is realistic as an estimate of hourly labor 
compensation in manufacturing, though it is high as an estimate of wage only.  It is 
certainly safe to say that Chinese factory workers earn less than 90 cents or $ 1 per hour 
on average. 
 
Outside the cities, labor compensation for manufacturing workers is indeed less 
than US$ 130 per month, though total labor compensation for city manufacturing workers 
is more like US$ 145-180 per month (Table 7).  Looking at wage only, TVE 
manufacturing workers earn US$ 70 per month and city manufacturing workers earn a 
wage of US$ 112 monthly.  City workers in electronics manufacturing reportedly earn an 
average wage of 17,636 yuan per year or US$ 177.50 per month (Table 6; China NBS & 
Labour, 2003, p. 225).  Adjusted to include social insurance and other labor 
compensation costs, their monthly total compensation averages about US$ 234-280.  But 
of course, electronics manufacturing workers outside the cities probably do earn less than 
US$ 130 per month, even if their enterprises are classified as large-scale TVE 
manufacturing enterprises (Table 7).   
 
Wages for auto workers and auto parts suppliers were not directly reported for 
2002, though city transportation equipment manufacturing employees reportedly earned 
14,409 yuan or about US$ 0.89 per hour in wages, which means that a wage estimate of 
US$ 0.90 is accurate for city auto-parts suppliers (Table 6; China NBS & Labour, 2003, 
p.  224).  Adjusting for all labor compensation costs, the hourly labor compensation of 
city transportation equipment manufacturing workers would be US$ 1.17-1.41.  
Therefore, an estimate for city auto worker compensation of US$ 1.50 per hour including 
all benefits is reasonable.  Auto and auto parts workers outside the cities would receive 
much less.   
 
City garment workers earn a reported annual average wage of 9,066 yuan or about 
US$ 0.56 per hour (Table 6; China NBS & Labour, 2003, p. 219).  After adjusting for 
other urban labor compensation costs, their total hourly compensation in 2002 was about 
US$ 0.74-0.88.  But outside the cities, the garment workers, most of whom are young and 
female, are among the lowest-paid manufacturing workers in China.  It is very likely that 
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they earn less than US$ 0.40 in hourly wage or total labor compensation.  In general, 
therefore, the estimates of PRC manufacturing wages or labor compensation put forth in 
the popular media are approximately true.            
Competitiveness of Manufacturing Industries in China  
 
 What makes manufacturing production in China competitive in the international 
market, and in China’s domestic market?  It is widely agreed that certain factors are 
paramount: 
 
 A. Low Wages and Labor Compensation Costs 
 
 One of the leading reasons why some of China’s own domestic manufacturing 
industries can sell their products at home and abroad, and why multinational and other 
foreign companies are moving their manufacturing operations to China, is the genuinely 
low cost of employing manufacturing workers in the PRC.  Here is a sampling of 
statements to this effect from a variety of sources and perspectives: 
 
China’s emergence as one of the world’s leading export nations is driven by a 
huge disparity in the cost of producing goods, caused primarily by hourly wages 
that are a fraction of those in the United States and Western Europe.  This is not 
news (Stalk & Young, 2004). 
 
China’s textile industry: China has become the largest fiber production and export 
nation in the world…China’s garment and other industries are relatively 
competitive.  The comprehensively large size of the industry and the low labor 
cost enable China to take a comparatively large international market share with 
low value-added production (CASS, 2001, pp. 109, 547). 
 
Juergen Peters, president of Germany’s IG Metall union and IMWF [International 
Metalworkers Federation] president, told a conference in Dearborn, Michigan, 
that the rapid development of the Chinese auto industry, coupled with the low 
wages paid to Chinese workers, make it inevitable that China will become a net 
exporter of vehicles (Szczesny, 2004).  
 
 The truly low cost of labor in China makes the PRC particularly competitive in 
the following types of manufacturing industries:  labor-intensive, assembly, reprocessing, 
low value-added, simple repetitive steps in the manufacturing process, food processing, 
etc.  “China has become an essential link in the global production chain for many labor-
intensive products…a manufacturing hub for the rest of the world in low-end labor-
intensive goods” (Hale & Hale, 2003).  Labor productivity (output per employee) is low 
by world standards in these kinds of PRC factories, and wages are correspondingly low 
(Lardy, 2004).  In the 1990s and beyond, the PRC showed widening wage inequality, as 
wages rose for city-born workers but basically stagnated for the least skilled and least 
educated workers (Fox & Zhao, 2002).  China is not particularly competitive in capital-
intensive and materials-intensive industries.  In addition, large proportions of China’s 
young adults now have at least a lower middle school education and therefore are 
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basically literate and numerate.  Millions of young and middle-aged workers from rural 
areas are also eager to get out of the countryside and therefore willing to work hard in a 
disciplined manner for pay that is low by international standards but higher than they 
could earn in agriculture.  China also has many millions of university-educated young 
adults who are especially competitive because they are good in engineering and technical 
fields, are hard-working and motivated, and work for a fraction of the salaries received by 
equally capable young adults in developed countries.  Therefore, “China rules in stocking 
stuffers, but it’s climbing the technology ladder too;” the PRC now produces half of the 
world’s cameras and photocopiers and one-quarter of the world’s television sets and 
washing machines (Forney, 2004, p. 34).  China “is the new workshop of the world, 
producing two-thirds of all photocopiers, microwave ovens, DVD players, and shoes, 
over half of all digital cameras, and around two-fifths of personal computers” 
(Economist, 2004b).   
 
 B. Relatively Stable Political Situation 
 
 If a company located in an economy with high labor costs wishes to move its 
manufacturing operations to a lower-cost environment, why would it choose China?  
Many other poor countries have extremely low costs of labor as well.  But many 
developing or poor countries are not attractive because they have unstable political, 
economic, and financial situations.  The PRC is not a perfect manufacturing environment 
by any means, but there is relatively low terrorist risk, civil unrest does not destabilize the 
economy, there are few public safety concerns for multinationals’ property and 
personnel, and the economy and financial system are functioning—not supremely well 
but at least adequately.  Multinational firms are thought to allocate their investment 
among countries so as to maximize their risk-adjusted profit (Caves, 1996; Zhang, 2001); 
China compares rather well with other less developed countries when both risk and costs 
of production are considered.        
 
 C. China’s Own Huge Potential or Actual Domestic Market 
 
 Of the world’s total population, 21 percent live in the PRC.  They provide a far 
larger domestic market for manufactures than any other developing country today with 
the possible exception of India (see also McGuckin & Spiegelman, 2004, pp. 4, 23).  
Though China is still a lower middle income country, ordinary people buy some 
manufactured goods, providing a ready market for the least expensive manufactured 
products.  More important, China has a growing middle class and a small luxury class, 
especially in cities.  The numbers of such consumers are variously estimated as follows: 
 
And Mr. Xie [Andy Xie, Chief Economist for Asia-Pacific at Morgan Stanley 
Dean Witter] estimates that in China today, about 50 million people can be 
generally considered middle class or on the way there very soon (China Radio 
International, 2001). 
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China’s emerging middle class, people with net income of at least $3,000 a year, 
numbers nearly 100 million and is growing about 20 percent yearly (Smith, 2002, 
p. 2). 
 
…China’s swelling middle class (the 120 million who now have disposable 
income of up to $8,000 per year, a group that could, according to Morgan Stanley, 
grow to nearly half a billion by 2010)…(Powell, 2001). 
 
Consumers of luxury products now account for 13% of the total population in 
China and are continuing to increase (New Express, 2004). 
 
China now has high penetration rates for a wide range of consumer goods—that 
is, today many more Chinese consumers buy many more goods.  There are color 
television sets in almost every urban home, refrigerators and washing machines in 
more than four out of five, videodisc players and air conditioners in half of them, 
microwave ovens in almost a third, and computers in one out of five…Close to 90 
percent of urban Chinese now own a home (Hale & Hale, 2003). 
 
 Because of its huge consumer base, the PRC is already the world’s biggest market 
for television sets, refrigerators, and mobile phones, and China ranks third after the U.S. 
and Japan in sales of personal computers (Smith, 2002, p. 2; Ramstad, 2004, p. A9).  No 
matter how China’s luxury class or middle class consumer base is defined or calculated, 
it is clear that the growing PRC domestic market is a factor drawing manufacturers to 
China.  Indeed, multinational corporations from the most developed countries and 
economic blocs—the U.S., Western Europe, and Japan—aim their foreign direct 
investment (FDI) into the PRC primarily at capital-intensive, technology-intensive, and 
skill-intensive products and services aimed at China’s domestic market, in contrast to the 
FDI from Hong Kong, Taiwan, Singapore, and South Korea into China, which is 
concentrated on labor-intensive, relatively low-technology manufactured goods to be 
exported to the international developed country market (Zhang, 2001).    
 
 D. Convenient Logistics in Coastal Regions of China 
 
 In certain coastal regions of China, especially the Pearl River Delta region of 
Guangdong Province near Hong Kong and Macao, the Yangtze  River Delta region 
including Shanghai and Zhejiang and southern Jiangsu Provinces, the Fujian Province 
coastal areas across from Taiwan, the Beijing-Tianjin region, and other coastal cities 
including Qingdao and Dalian, the local infrastructure supports comparatively low-cost 
and efficient manufacturing production.  Huge networks of component suppliers have 
concentrated in these places, providing manufacturers with many choices for basic parts 
and with the ability to pit vendors against one another (Ramstad, 2004, p. A9; Stalk & 
Young, 2004).  “The critical mass of factories, subcontractors, and specialized vendors 
has created a manufacturing environment with which few can compete” (Garten, 2002).  
Transportation and telecommunications networks are adequate in these areas.  Improving 
infrastructure has been an important factor bringing FDI to China’s coastal regions 
(Zhang, 2001).  Also in the booming coastal cities, there are large numbers of educated 
 45
and bilingual or multilingual local Chinese to staff the professional and managerial layers 
of manufacturing concerns, and they are willing to work for moderate salaries. 
 
 E. Low Price of Land       
 
 Many domestic manufacturing concerns in China never had to buy the land for 
their factories.  Land was simply allocated to state-owned or collective-owned enterprises 
during the Maoist command economy period before 1978.  During the economic reform 
period, many such factories still inhabit the free land.  If they form a joint venture or are 
bought out by a foreign company, the assigned or negotiated value of that land is part of 
what they bring to the deal, but first the land must be converted from “allocated” to 
“granted” for a large fee.  Today, the value of land in urban or rural China is only partly 
market driven; much of whatever price emerges is still arbitrary and command economy 
driven: “There is still little transparency in transfers of land-use rights in China, with 
most transactions set in bilateral agreements between buyers and sellers” (Ho, 2004). 
 
 Current land values in different urban areas of China vary enormously.  Property 
prices have risen dramatically in Shanghai, sparking fears of a “bubble” and the possible 
future collapse of real estate and land prices (McDaniels, 2004, p. 9; French, 2004, p. 
A7).  The cities with the most expensive land in the PRC today are, in order from the 
most expensive: Beijing, Shanghai, Hangzhou (capital of Zhejiang Province), Nanjing 
(capital of Jiangsu Province), Chengdu, Tianjin, Guangzhou (capital of Guangdong 
Province), Chongqing, and Shenzhen which is in the Pearl River Delta of Guangdong.  
Land prices in the Yangtze  River Delta have now surpassed those in the Pearl River 
Delta (Ho, 2004).  However, one economist reported that in China: “Land prices have 
declined by about 70% in major urban areas since 1993” (Xie, 2001). 
 
F. Incentive Policies to Promote Foreign Investment in China  
 
 During the 1980s and 1990s, the PRC gave special financial incentives, land use 
benefits, foreign currency exchange preferences, tax holidays, and other tax incentives to 
foreign companies willing to invest and set up factories in its coastal regions, primarily 4 
(now 5) special economic zones (SEZs) and 14 opened cities located in Guangdong, 
Shanghai, Jiangsu, Fujian, and other coastal provinces; therefore FDI poured into the 
PRC in general and into these Chinese coastal areas in particular (Zhang, 2001).  In 
addition, China’s regulatory climate has improved in some ways that promote 
entrepreneurship, new businesses, and flexibility of hiring workers.  The cost of starting a 
business in China is higher and the time required to do so is longer than in developed 
countries, but these measures are more favorable in the PRC than the East Asia/Pacific 
average; and in order to promote the hiring of more workers, the PRC has slashed 
regulatory burdens associated with hiring (Wright, 2004, p. 12). 
 
 PRC policies in the 1990s and today encourage foreign direct investment, 
particularly in manufacturing, with the result that a little over half of FDI has been in the 
manufacturing sector: 
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Not only does China place few restrictions on foreign ownership of 
manufacturing firms, through its tariff and other policies it allows foreign firms 
that produce for the export market to operate at international prices.  Machinery 
and equipment that goes into foreign joint ventures and wholly foreign-owned 
firms is entirely exempt from import duties.  And the foreign-sourced parts and 
components that are assembled into finished goods are also exempt from all 
import duties when they are re-exported in the form of finished goods.  Moreover, 
manufacturers are eligible for a rebate of almost all domestic value-added taxes 
they have paid for any content in their exported goods that is sourced from within 
China (Lardy, 2003). 
What Hampers China’s Competitiveness in Manufacturing? 
 From an international perspective, the PRC is very competitive in producing most 
manufactured products.  However, certain aspects of conditions in China deter some 
companies from moving their manufacturing to China or induce companies to put their 
production operations elsewhere instead.  Some such considerations are as follows: 
 A. Rising Manufacturing Wages and Labor Costs in China’s Cities  
Real living standards have been rising in PRC cities, and real wages have been 
rising for urban staff and workers in manufacturing, as shown in Tables 11 and 12 (see 
also Lardy, 2004).  Urban manufacturing wages rose in the early and mid-1990s, and 
increased very fast at the end of the 1990s and in the early 21st century.  Tables 11 and 12 
and Figure 4 show that these generalizations about city manufacturing wage trends also 
hold for manufacturing employees in state-owned units, collective-owned units, and 
“other” ownership units (joint ventures, foreign-owned, multinational, etc.). 
Why are urban manufacturing wages rising rapidly in China?  Some scholars 
argue that because labor productivity is rising rapidly in China’s city factories, we would 
expect city manufacturing wages to also rise (Lardy, 2004b).  Others contend that the 
huge supply of surplus urban and rural workers ought to keep these wages down: “The 
coincidence of rising mass unemployment and rapid increases in real wages in the late 
1990s appears contrary to the predictions of competitive labour markets.”  Forces raising 
urban manufacturing wages have included rising labor productivity and a sustained rise in 
the returns to education and skill, as well as a wage premium for Communist Party 
members and others still remaining in protected state-owned enterprises (Fox & Zhao, 
2002; Appleton & Song, 2004).  Rigidities in urban labor markets have also forced up 
wages and impeded competition (Knight & Yueh, 2004).  Simultaneously, however, the 
range of wages in China manufacturing has widened, and the least educated unskilled 
workers have experienced near-stagnation in their real wages “under the twin pressures of 
heavy migration from China’s villages and intense pursuit of cost advantage from 
overseas buyers of labor-intensive goods” (Rawski, 2003; Fox & Zhao, 2002, pp. 3, 22).        
 In addition to the wage bill, required payments for other urban employee benefits 
have increased (Yang, 2003).  China is trying to build a viable system of pensions, 
medical benefits, unemployment benefits, workers’ compensation, and housing benefits 
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at least for its city population.  Rawski argues that required employer payments for these 
urban social safety net programs in the PRC are now higher than they need to be, for 
example substantially higher than in Malaysia, South Korea, Taiwan, or Singapore 
(Rawski, 2003, p. 27).  In some cities the mandated payments are rising rapidly.  For 
example, 
Average labor costs in Shanghai rose by 15% last year due to increases in welfare 
payments, healthcare subsidies, and housing subsidies.  On average local 
companies paid 10,849 yuan in fixed and optional welfare fees, up 22.4% year on 
the year.  This rise was significantly higher than in cities such as Kunshan, 
Nanjing, Hangzhou, Suzhou, or Ningbo (French, 2004, p. A7).      
As wages and mandated social insurance payments increase, urban China 
becomes less competitive in the global context and even in the PRC context.  Shanghai, 
for example, is beginning to become too expensive for many manufacturing concerns: 
“The massive influx of investment and rapidly improving standard of living has driven up 
labor costs in Shanghai, almost high enough to price Shanghai out of the market” 
(McDaniels, 2004, p. 8).  Many businesses are now locating elsewhere.  “Companies 
moving from Shanghai to neighboring Anhui Province report that they can cut costs by 
50%.  Few multinationals can resist those kinds of savings” (French, 2004, p. A7).  Cities 
throughout China are much more expensive for manufacturing than even their nearby 
suburbs: “Henry Tan, chief executive of Luen Thai, Hong Kong’s largest garment 
business with 20,000 employees, says he can save a third in power costs and half in wage 
bills just by relocating a factory half an hour’s drive from Guangzhou, the capital of 
Guangdong” (Economist, 2004f, p. 44).  Many manufacturing companies are now 
choosing to move their production operations from developed countries or from China to 
other developing countries with lower labor costs.  For instance, India, Pakistan, and 
Vietnam are becoming competitive as textile and apparel producing and exporting 
countries because the cost of textile production is generally lower there than in China 
(Xin & Liang, 2004).  
 B. The PRC is Easy to Enter but Very Difficult to Leave 
 
 China’s policies attract foreign companies to the PRC, but sometimes make it 
hard to succeed in China and even harder to back out again.  China’s legal system is very 
slow and ineffective at enforcing legal contracts; it is also subject to corruption and 
arbitrary rulings.  The PRC has been found wanting with regard to creditor rights and 
credit information; China has no private credit bureaus and the existing public credit 
registry covers only about 3 potential borrowers per 1,000.  Therefore, entrepreneurs, 
first-time borrowers, and repeat borrowers with good credit history cannot prove their 
credit-worthiness and borrow for business development.  Bankruptcy proceedings are 
slow.  The PRC has the least flexibility in the Asia/Pacific region with regard to firing 
workers; therefore, laying off redundant workers and streamlining operations is still 
difficult (Wright, 2004, p. 13).  Finally, China mandates that foreign companies bring in 
large amounts of convertible currency when setting up there, but severely restricts taking 
profits out of China.   
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 C. Other Constraints on Future Growth 
 
1) Electric Power Shortages  
 The PRC economy has been booming for so long that power shortages have 
become a problem.  In 2004, electric power outages, blackouts, shortfalls, and rationing 
have hit manufacturers in the Pearl River Delta and Shanghai.  Power has been cut 1-3 
days a week in many factories in Guangdong.  “Demand nationwide is exceeding 
capacity for a third year, causing shortages in at least 24 of 31 provinces, the State 
Electricity Council said.  It has been fueled by industrial output that surged 17 per cent 
nationwide last year and 22 per cent in Guangdong” (Bloomberg, 2004b). 
  2) Raw Material Shortages 
 China’s rapidly growing and possibly overheated economy is causing domestic 
and, in some cases, global shortages of certain raw materials and construction materials 
needed for manufacturing production or expansion.  For example, China’s sharp increase 
in exports of textiles and clothing in 2004 has driven up domestic prices of cotton and 
other fibers (Bloomberg, 2004a).   
  3) Lack of Patent, Trademark, and Copyright Protection in China 
 The PRC has serious deficiencies in enforcing the protection of intellectual 
property (AmCham China, 2004a, 2004b).  Patents and copyright, both domestic and 
foreign, are ignored with impunity in China’s manufacturing sector.  Trademark/brand 
theft is epidemic and very expensive and slow to attempt to correct (Ho & Fiske, 2004, p. 
24).  Production processes, brand names, and innovations are stolen by domestic PRC 
producers and churned out at a cheap price for the Chinese and global markets.  The PRC 
government has made occasional attempts to stop this intellectual piracy under intense 
international pressure, but only with temporary success: “China’s thriving industry in 
product piracy routinely violates copyrights, trademarks and patents on movies, designer 
clothes and other goods, despite promises by Beijing to crack down” (AP, 2004; Evans, 
2004).  Many multinational companies have entered joint ventures with Chinese partners, 
often because PRC government controls prevent them from entering China any other 
way, only to discover that the “partner” has stolen all the foreign company’s proprietary 
information and set up a competing production center illegally producing the product 
patented by the multinational.  Globally, based on Security Management’s Intellectual 
Property Security Survey conducted in April 1998, Chinese entities carried out 41 percent 
of the theft of American-owned technology; the PRC treats such technology piracy as 
merely a minor civil or administrative matter rather than the crime that it is (Snodey, 
2004, pp. 6-8).  Because of this problem of systematic theft of intellectual property in 
China, many foreign companies avoid entering China and choose to continue producing 
in developed countries or move to countries that protect intellectual property.     
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 Conclusions 
 
This report has collected and assessed the available statistics on manufacturing 
employment and labor compensation in the People’s Republic of China.  Official data 
from the China National Bureau of Statistics and the Ministry of Labour and Social 
Security show a steep drop in urban manufacturing employment in China from 1995 to 
2001, and in total PRC manufacturing employment from 1995 to 2000, after which the 
numbers stabilized or began to rise.  The declines in PRC manufacturing employment in 
the late 1990s were caused by massive layoffs and early retirements of redundant workers 
in China’s urban state-owned and urban collective-owned manufacturing enterprises, and 
by a change in definition starting in 1998 that has included only on-post (not laid-off) 
manufacturing workers in the urban employment numbers from 1998 to the present. 
 
Published labor statistics for the PRC continue to emphasize data for the declining 
urban state-owned and collective-owned enterprises, while neglecting the healthiest and 
most dynamic parts of the economy.  This means that the employment and wage numbers 
put out by the Labour Ministry and by the National Bureau of Statistics are becoming 
ever more irrelevant.  In manufacturing, the action has moved to the private sector.  In 
urban statistics, the booming private domestic, foreign-owned, and multinational 
manufacturing enterprises and corporations are lumped under the dismissive term “Other 
Ownership Units.”  Small privately-owned and family-owned urban siying qiye 
manufacturing businesses are entirely ignored in the employment and wage data from the 
Labour Ministry and NBS, and the same is true with self-employed manufacturing 
workers in the cities.  Yet it is the urban private sector that has seen ever-increasing 
manufacturing employment.  “Other” urban manufacturing ownership units had only 1.35 
million employees in 1990; the number has grown every year since then and reached 
15.82 million by yearend 2002.  Meanwhile, the residual category of urban 
manufacturing workers, which is supposed to be the small privately-owned siying qiye 
and getihu, rose from less than 1 million in 1990 to 2.72 million in 1994 to 6.33 million 
in 2000 to 8.21 million by yearend 2002.  PRC government statistical and labor agencies 
do not pay adequate attention to the private manufacturing corporations and the small 
manufacturing businesses in China’s cities.    
 
PRC employment and wage statistics focus only on the cities, while the 
expanding “rural,” town, suburban, and industrial park manufacturing enterprises all over 
China are almost entirely left out of the statistics.  The China Labour Statistics Yearbook 
2003 gave no wage data at all for the 45 million “rural” manufacturing employees they 
reported to exist, while providing labor compensation figures for only 30 million of the 
38 million “urban” manufacturing workers.  Apparently, essentially all or almost all of 
China’s manufacturing enterprises and factories located outside strict city limits are 
lumped together under the category “village and town enterprises” (TVEs).  This term is 
a misnomer for all the employers, both domestic and foreign, of the 71 million non-city 
manufacturing employees in the PRC who are referred to as TVE manufacturing 
employees. 
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The Ministry of Agriculture, in a holdover from the Maoist decades, is 
responsible for supervising and collecting statistics on all the industrial enterprises 
located outside city limits in China.  For the year 2002, one of their publications, the 
China Village and Town Enterprise Yearbook 2003, published, for the first time, two 
relevant numbers for the purposes of this report, the total number of TVE manufacturing 
employees in China for 2002, and the total labor compensation costs for 2002 for all 
those employees. 
 
Adding together manufacturing employment numbers for the cities and estimates 
for the TVEs suggests that the PRC had about 105 million manufacturing employees in 
1990 and the number may have increased in the early 1990s to a peak of 130 million in 
1996.  This large number may have included some over-reporting of TVE manufacturing 
employees, along with the surplus urban manufacturing employees not yet deleted from 
the total urban manufacturing employment figures.  After statistical corrections in both 
urban and TVE data, the PRC had approximately 112 million manufacturing employees 
at yearend 1998.  The number declined to about 108 million in 2000-2001 and rose 
slightly to 109 million by yearend 2002.  These numbers are based on the supposition that 
there is no overlap between TVE and urban manufacturing employee figures.   
 
This report has combined employment and wage data for China’s urban 
manufacturing workers and for the non-city TVE manufacturing workers to derive 
approximations of annual, monthly, and hourly labor compensation for urban and non-
city and all-China manufacturing employees.  Reported wage and labor compensation 
data have been adjusted separately for urban data and for TVE data.  Urban 
manufacturing wage data for 2002 were adjusted by multiplying the wage figures by 
1.32-1.58, providing a range of labor compensation figures per employee, depending on 
whether the reported wages are adjusted only for employer social insurance payments or 
instead for all labor-related costs.  TVE labor compensation data were adjusted by 
multiplying the wage figures by 1.00-1.16, on the assumption that the likely true 
employer costs for insurance and welfare and other non-wage compensation was 
somewhere in the range from zero to 16 percent of the reported labor compensation data 
for TVE manufacturing workers.  These estimates were then combined for 100.6 million 
manufacturing employees in the PRC to represent all-China 2002 annual, monthly, and 
hourly labor compensation in manufacturing.       
  
Results of this exercise show that China manufacturing workers in 2002 received 
hourly labor compensation of approximately US$ 0.56-0.67.  City manufacturing 
employees received about US$ 0.91-1.09, more than twice the hourly labor compensation 
of US$ 0.42-0.49 received by TVE (that is, non-city) manufacturing workers.  Because 
living costs are so low in China, this report also calculates the labor compensation of 
PRC manufacturing employees in international purchasing power parity dollars.  China’s 
manufacturing workers in 2002 got total compensation that would be similar to U.S. 
employees receiving labor compensation of US$ 3 per hour in terms of what the money 
would purchase.  China’s TVE manufacturing employees got the equivalent of US$ 2 
purchasing power and PRC urban manufacturing employees received the equivalent of 
US$ 4-5 in terms of what they could buy. 
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This report demonstrates that manufacturing employment in China increased 
during the 1980s and early 1990s, peaked in about 1995-1996, declined during the late 
1990s until 2000-2001, and increased again in 2002.  Best guess estimates are provided 
for annual, monthly, and hourly labor compensation in manufacturing.  As of 2002, the 
latest year for which wage data are available, average labor compensation for 30 million 
PRC urban manufacturing employees was approximately US$ 1.06 per hour, while the 
reported 71 million manufacturing employees in village and town enterprises (TVEs) 
outside the cities averaged about US$ 0.45 in labor compensation per hour of work.  
Combining the labor compensation of manufacturing workers in cities and in the towns 
and villages to derive an all-China estimate results in labor compensation of US$ 0.63 per 
hour of work for 101 million manufacturing workers in China.  
 
China is a developing country that is rapidly changing, both statistically and 
economically, from a Communist command economy with primarily administrative 
statistics toward a market economy with modern, sophisticated, internationally 
comparable statistics.  This report shows that PRC statistics on manufacturing 
employment and labor compensation have not reached world standards.  Nevertheless, 
the available statistics can be utilized, given a set of explicit extrapolations and 
assumptions, to estimate China’s manufacturing employment levels and trends, as well as 
the current level of labor compensation in the PRC manufacturing sector. 
Future Research on PRC Manufacturing Employment and Compensation 
The following items should have high priority for future data collection in China and 
future research on China manufacturing: 
1. For the important goal of calculating average hourly labor compensation in 
manufacturing in the PRC, the highest priority is to get better data on actual hours 
worked by employees in the manufacturing sector.  China’s government could 
itself gather and publish more systematic data on this important measure, and 
scholars should also emphasize gathering information on this variable. 
2. During the year 2005, with reference year of 2004, China is conducting its first 
national census of the economy.  This Economic Census is expected to refine, 
correct, and update data on who works where in manufacturing, and on labor 
compensation received.  “The survey [PRC economic census] is sure to find that 
private-sector employment is much higher than currently reported” (Economist, 
2004a, p. 28).  When results of the economic census become available at the end 
of 2005, the new information should be used to update this report. 
3. Migrant manufacturing workers:  Publicly available information on China’s 
manufacturing employees does not provide enough information about how many 
migrant manufacturing workers there are in China, where they are working, what 
they are paid in comparison to locals at their migration destination, whether or not 
social insurance payments are deducted from their wages, and what social 
insurance payments employers must remit to the authorities based on the wages of 
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in-migrants.  It is important to know these facts, because rural-to-city and rural-to-
town manufacturing employees will tolerate lower pay and longer working hours 
than urban-born employees.  Migrant workers help keep China globally 
competitive in manufacturing.  A further search for information on China’s 
migrant manufacturing workers is needed. 
4. Rural manufacturing employment and labor compensation:  Much more research 
is needed to try to fill in some of the missing information on rural and town 
manufacturing employment and wages.  Reporting is routinely more thorough for 
city manufacturing units in China. 
5. Labor force surveys: China needs to design, carry out, and publish results of labor 
force surveys using international standards and definitions.  The PRC reportedly 
has been conducting experimental labor force surveys, but the results have so far 
not been released. 
6. More work is needed by China’s statistical leaders and by analysts of labor force 
data to reconcile and make sense of the conflicting sets of manufacturing 
employment data so far released.  Communication, coordination, and better 
statistical oversight are needed among the NBS, MOLSS, Ministry of Agriculture, 
and SAIC, and with scholars utilizing China’s collected official labor force 
statistics.        
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Table 1. China Employed Population, Census 2000 and Enterprise Data 2000
(In millions)
Total Farming, Mining Manufacturing Production and Construction Geological Transport, Wholesale
forestry, and supply of prospecting storage, and retail
animal quarrying  electricity, gas and water post and trade and
husbandry and water conservancy telecommu- catering
and fishery nications services
Census data:
709.71 456.89 7.41 88.43 4.44 19.05 0.90 18.30 47.48
Enterprise data:
629.78 333.55 5.97 80.43 2.84 35.52 1.10 20.29 46.86
Difference:
79.93 123.34 1.44 8.00 1.60 -16.47 -0.20 -1.99 0.62
Finance Real Social Health care, Education, Scientific Government Others
and estate services sports and culture and arts, research and and party agencies
insurance trade social welfare  radio, film and polytechnical and social 
television services organizations
Census data:
4.19 1.64 15.27 7.53 18.16 1.59 16.69 1.74
Enterprise data:
3.27 1.00 9.21 4.88 15.65 1.74 11.04 56.43
Difference:
0.92 0.64 6.06 2.65 2.51 -0.15 5.65 -54.69
Notes: Prepared by Judith Banister. Difference is census figure minus enterprise figure.
Enterprise data are for yearend 2000; census data are November 1, 2000, which was two months earlier. Therefore, the numbers from the two sources are
not expected to be exactly the same. Census figures are derived by the author from the census long form sample and refer to population age 15 and older.
Sources:  Census data: China NBS, 2002, Vol. 2, pp. 1569-1570.
Enterprise data: China NBS & Labour, 2003, pp. 8-9.
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Table 2. Reported Manufacturing Employment in China, 1978-2002
(Yearend figures in millions)
Year PRC PRC "rural" Derived urban PRC manufacturing PRC manufacturing urban "staff and workers" Village & town enterprises
manufacturing manufacturing manufacturing "employment in urban units" Total State-owned Urban collective- Other ownership (TVEs)
employment employment employment Total Male Female units owned units  units Industry (gong ye ) Manufacturing
1978 53.32 17.34 35.98 35.95 24.49 11.46 17.34
1980 58.99 19.42 39.57 39.47 26.01 13.46 19.42
1985 74.12 27.41 46.71 46.20 29.75 16.08 0.37 41.37
1986 80.19 31.39 48.80 48.20 30.96 16.80 0.46 47.62
1987 83.59 32.97 50.62 49.88 32.09 17.24 0.58 52.67
1988 86.52 34.13 52.39 51.49 33.27 17.45 0.77 57.03
1989 85.47 32.56 52.91 52.06 33.44 17.54 1.08 56.24
1990 86.24 32.29 53.95 53.04 33.95 17.73 1.35 55.72 (51.50)
1991 88.39 32.68 55.71 54.43 34.82 17.82 1.80 58.14 (53.73)
1992 91.06 34.68 56.38 55.08 35.26 17.47 2.36 63.36 (58.56)
1993 92.95 36.59 56.36 54.69 34.44 15.95 4.30 72.60 (67.10)
1994 96.13 38.49 57.64 54.92 30.31 24.61 54.34 33.21 15.15 5.98 69.62 (64.34)
1995 98.03 39.71 58.32 54.93 30.11 24.82 54.39 33.26 14.17 6.96 75.65 (69.92)
1996 97.63 40.19 57.44 53.44 29.52 23.92 52.93 32.18 13.46 7.28 78.60 (72.65)
1997 96.12 40.32 55.80 51.30 28.44 22.86 50.83 30.11 12.44 8.27 61.49 (56.84)
1998 83.19 39.29 43.90 38.26 37.69 18.83 7.42 11.44 73.34 (67.79)
1999 81.09 39.53 41.56 35.54 20.12 15.42 34.96 16.48 6.22 12.25 73.95 (68.35)
2000 80.43 41.09 39.34 33.01 18.75 14.25 32.40 14.15 5.19 13.06 74.67 (69.01)
2001 80.83 42.96 37.87 30.70 17.52 13.18 30.10 11.94 4.25 13.91 76.15 (70.38)
2002 83.07 45.06 38.02 29.81 16.98 12.83 29.07 9.79 3.46 15.82 76.68 70.87
    Notes: Prepared by Judith Banister. These figures refer to the mainland provinces of the PRC not including Hong Kong, Macao, or Taiwan. These data are from 
          China's annual yearend reporting system, not from census data and not adjusted to agree with census data. The column on "Derived urban manufacturing 
          employment" is calculated from national manufacturing employment minus rural manufacturing employment. TVE manufacturing employment is reported
          only for 2002, when it constituted 92.4% of TVE industry ( gong ye ) employment; other years are estimated using the same percentage.
    Sources: China NBS & Labour, 2003, pp. 8, 10, 13, 16, 21, 23-26, 171, 473. China Village and Town  Enterprise Yearbook 2003 , p. 130.
63
Figure 1. Structure of Manufacturing Employment in China, Yearend 2002
(In millions)
Notes: Prepared by Judith Banister. The official total yearend 2002 manufacturing employment in China was 83.07 million, of which 38.02 
           million was urban and 45.06 million was rural. But if non-urban manufacturing employment was best represented by village and  
           town enterprise (TVE) employment of 70.87 million, then the total yearend 2002 China manufacturing employment was 108.88 million.
Sources: Table 2 and text.
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Total: Reported 83.07 OR (urban + TVE) 108.88
 Of which:
    Rural reported 45.06
              OR
    TVE 70.87
 Of which:
    Urban 38.02
 Of which:
   Employment in urban units 29.81
 Of which:
   Individual and small private business 8.21
 Of which:
   On-post staff and workers 29.07
                  Of which:
                       State-owned 9.79
                       Urban collective 3.46
                       Other ownership 15.82
   Other 0.74
 Of which:
   Small private enterprise 5.64
               Of which:
                    Investors: 0.79
                    Hired workers: 4.85
  
    Individual and household 2.57
Figure 2. China Manufacturing Employment, 1990-2002
Notes: Prepared by Judith Banister.
TVE manufacturing employment is derived from
reported TVE industry (gongye ) employment.
Source: Calculated and copied from Table 2.
65
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
1990199119921993199419951996199719981999200020012002
M
illio
n
Urban + TVE
Reported
Table 3. China Manufacturing Employment, Two Alternative Series, 1990 - 2002
Series 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Urban + TVE
105.45 109.44 114.94 123.46 121.98 128.24 130.09 112.64 111.69 109.91 108.35 108.25 108.88manufacturing
employment
Official reported
86.24 88.39 91.06 92.95 96.13 98.03 97.63 96.12 83.19 81.09 80.43 80.83 83.07manufacturing
employment
Note: Prepared by Judith Banister.
Source: Calculated from Table 2.
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Table 4.  China, Manufacturing Workers by Occupation, Census of November 1, 2000
(In millions)
Occupation Number of manufacturing workers
Total Percent of total Male Female
All manufacturing 88.43 100 % 48.10 40.33
Production, transport, equipment and related workers
(Shengchan, yunshu, shebei renyuan
ji youguan renyuan) 67.36 76.2 35.18 32.18
Sales and service workers
(Shangye, fuwuye renyuan) 7.65 8.7 4.57 3.08
Professional/technical
(Zhuanye, jishu renyuan) 4.97 5.6 2.29 2.68
Clerical and related workers
(Banshi renyuan ji youguan renyuan) 4.39 5.0 3.02 1.37
Administrator and manager
(Guojia jiguan, dangqun zuzhi qiye,
shiye, danwei fuzeren) 2.89 3.3 2.50 0.39
Agriculture and related workers
(Nong, lin, mu, yu, shuiliye renyuan) 1.04 1.2 0.47 0.57
Others
(Bubian fenlei renyuan) 0.14 0.2 0.08 0.06
Notes: Prepared by Judith Banister. Figures in this table are based on census long form data from a 10% sample of households, extrapolated
          by this author to the total civilian population of China at ages 15 and older.
Source: China NBS, 2002, Vol. 2, p. 1569. 
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             Table 5. China Published Compensation Data for the Manufacturing Sector, 2002
(Annual wages, earnings, or subsidy, in 2002 Chinese yuan or renminbi)
Category Total 2002 Yearend Average  Average 2002 Average 2002
of workers "earnings" 2002 number of "earnings" or living subsidy
or "wages" number of  employees "wages" per
paid employees in 2002 employee
Manufacturing 334.39 29.81 (29.98 11,152
"urban units" billion yuan million million) yuan
           Of which:
              On-post urban 321.90 29.07 29.26 11,001
              manufacturing billion million million yuan
              "staff and yuan
              workers"
           "Other" urban 0.74 17,237
            manufacturing million yuan
         employment
Not-on-post urban 9.13 2,213
manufacturing million yuan
"staff and workers"
Manufacturing
village & town 489.22 70.87 (70.62 (6,927
enterprises (TVEs) billion yuan million million) yuan)
   Of which:
          Large-scale
             manufacturing 168.94 19.05 (18.98 (8,899
           TVEs (guimo billion yuan million million) yuan)
    yi shang)
Notes: Prepared by Judith Banister. In the sources, remuneration for workers in urban manufacturing   
           units. and for "other" urban manufacturing employees is called "earnings" (laodong baochou). But
           remuneration for on-post urban manufacturing staff and workers is called "wages" (gongzi).
           For manufacturing TVEs, only the total 2002 expenditure for labor compensation costs is reported 
           (laodongzhe baochou) , but the average per employee is not directly reported.
           The numbers in parenthesis are derived from other numbers reported in the table or in the sources.
           All figures for manufacturing "urban units" exclude self-employed individuals and small privately 
           owned firms.
Sources:  China NBS & Labour, 2003, pp. 29, 34, 46, 169, 171, 179, 230, 243, 249, 473.
               China Village and Town Enterprise Yearbook 2003,  pp. 130-131.
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Figure 3. China, Components of Urban Wage Statistics 
 
 
From 1990 to 2004, the statistical concept of wage (gongzi) for on-post urban “staff 
and workers” includes the following components, whether the employees receive the 
wage or benefit in money or in kind, and whether or not they are taxable items: 
 
Monthly or annual salary income (including base wage and additions based on 
position, seniority, wage scale, etc.) 
Wage during on-the-job training, probationary period 
Employee income paid on an irregular basis 
 Hourly payment for work performed 
 Piece-work payment for work performed 
 Bonus payments 
 Incentive, performance-based payments 
 Overtime pay 
 Hardship, danger pay 
 All kinds of subsidies in cash or in kind 
 Festival, holiday subsidy 
 Travel money, food allowance while traveling 
 Transport subsidy (car or shuttle bus provided, cash for bus or taxi, etc.) 
 Personal services such as baths, haircuts 
 Books, newspapers, magazines provided for employees 
 Meals provided, food allowance 
Housing subsidy (dormitory provided, or directly subsidized rent or purchase of 
housing) 
Individual income tax deducted from wage and paid directly by enterprise to 
government 
Social insurance funds (pension, medical, unemployment insurance funds and 
housing purchase fund) that are deducted from employee wage and paid by work 
unit to government on behalf of the employee 
Money for rent and utilities (electricity, water) 
Money given for fixed-line or mobile phone 
Clothing subsidy 
Subsidy compensating workers for lack of vacation time 
Wage during approved leaves of absence, pay for time not worked (regular 
vacation, compassionate leave, to visit relatives, family planning operation, 
national or societal duty, study leave, leave due to sickness or injury) 
Anything that has the nature or spirit of labor compensation, even if it is not 
spelled out in the regulations 
 
 
Note: Prepared by Judith Banister. 
 
Source: Wage reporting instructions, 2004, pp. 2-1 to 2-5  (see bibliography). 
Table 6. China, Urban Manufacturing Employment and Wages by Sub-sector, 2002
(Average 2002 wages in yuan)
Urban Yearend 2002 Average 2002
manufacturing urban earnings
sub-sector employees per employee
Textile industry 2,841,565 7,268
Timber, bamboo, natural fiber & straw products 267,666 7,339
Food processing 977,439 7,965
Nonmetal mineral products 2,116,034 8,123
Papermaking and paper products 592,400 8,668
Other manufacturing 601,416 8,781
Furniture manufacturing 180,484 8,881
Garments and other fiber products 1,336,191 9,066
Leather, furs, down and related products 578,590 9,108
Beverage manufacturing 740,250 9,619
Rubber products 377,633 10,055
Food products manufacturing 621,757 10,064
Metal products 897,455 10,075
Plastic products 606,800 10,131
Chemical raw materials & products 2,213,256 10,359
Cultural, educational, and sport products 294,636 10,390
Special purpose equipment manufacturing 1,400,594 10,406
Ordinary machinery manufacturing 1,921,315 10,668
Printing & record medium reproduction 493,497 10,863
Chemical fibers manufacturing 263,378 11,404
Electric equipment and machinery 1,441,399 12,405
Smelting & pressing of nonferrous metals 755,646 12,491
Instruments & stationery machine tools 464,762 12,720
Medical & pharmaceutical products 844,857 13,207
Transportation equipment manufacturing 2,319,421 14,409
Smelting & pressing of ferrous metals 1,900,648 15,032
Petroleum processing and coking products 565,505 17,357
Electronics and telecommunications 1,623,783 17,636
Tobacco processing 233,485 23,744
     Notes: These data refer only to urban manufacturing employment and wages, totaling 29.47 million   
     million urban manufacturing workers. Rural manufacturing workers in each sub-sector undoubtedly
     have lower earnings than shown here. These earnings figures (laodong baochou)  do not include
     required employer social insurance payments or other non-wage labor costs.
     Source: China NBS & Labour, 2003, pp. 218-225.
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Table 7. China, Manufacturing Labor Compensation in Dollars, 2002
(At prevailing commercial exchange rate, and in international PPP dollars)
Category of Average  Average 2002 Total labor Annual Annual Monthly Monthly Monthly Hourly Hourly Hourly
Manufacturing number of "earnings" or compensation compensation compensation compensation compensation compensation compensation compensation compensation
workers  employees "wages" per per employee per employee per employee per employee per employee per employee per employee per employee per employee
in 2002 employee 2002 US dollars PPP dollars in yuan US dollars PPP dollars in yuan US dollars PPP dollars
Manufacturing 29.98 11,152 14,721- $ 1,778- PPP$ 8,267- 1,227- $ 148- PPP$ 689- 7.53- $ 0.91- PPP$ 4.23-
"urban units" million yuan 17,620 yuan $2,128 9,895 1,468 yuan $177 825 9.01 yuan $1.09 5.06
      Of which:
           On-post urban 29.26 11,001 14,521- $ 1,754- PPP$ 8,155- 1,210- $ 146- PPP$ 680- 7.43- $ 0.90- PPP$ 4.17-
           manufacturing million yuan 17,382 yuan $2,099 9,761 1,448 yuan $175 813 8.89 yuan $1.07 4.99
           staff & workers
         "Other" urban 0.72 17,237 22,753- $ 2,748- PPP$ 12,778- 1,896- $ 229- PPP$ 1,065- 11.64- $ 1.41- PPP$ 6.54-
          manufacturing million yuan 27,234 yuan $3,289 15,295 2,270 yuan $274 1,275 13.93 yuan $1.68 7.82
       employment
Manufacturing
village & town 70.62 6,927 6,927- $ 837- PPP$ 3,890- 577 - 670 $ 70 - $ 81 PPP$ 324- 3.46- $ 0.42- PPP$ 1.95-
enterprises (TVEs) million yuan 8,035 yuan $970 4,513 yuan 376 4.02 yuan $0.49 2.26
      Of which:
      Large-scale 18.98 8,899 8,899- $ 1,075- PPP$ 4,998- 742 - 860 $ 90 - $ 104 PPP$ 416- 4.45 - 5.16 $ 0.54- PPP$ 2.50-
         manufacturing million yuan 10,323 yuan $1,247 5,797 yuan 483 yuan $0.62 2.90
        TVEs
All China 100.61 8,186 9,250- $ 1,117- PPP$ 5,195- 771- PPP$ 433- 4.68- $ 0.56- PPP$ 2.63-
manufacturing million yuan 10,892 $1,315 6,117 908 yuan $ 93 - $ 110 510 5.51 yuan $0.67 3.09
urban units + TVEs yuan
     Notes: Prepared by Judith Banister. First columns are from Table 5. Total labor compensation for urban workers is 1.32-1.58 times the wage, and for TVE workers is 1.00-1.16
     times the wage. Commercial exchange rate is 8.28 yuan = US$ 1. To calculate international Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) dollars, multiply dollars at commercial exchange
     rate by 4.65. Hourly compensation is calculated assuming that urban manufacturing employees perform 1,955 actual hours of work per year, and TVE workers 2,000 hours per
     year. See text for detail.
     Sources: Table 4; China NBS & Labour, 2003,  pp. 29, 34, 46, 169, 171, 179, 230, 249, 473; China Village and Town Enterprise Yearbook 2003,  pp. 130-131; World Bank,
     2003, pp. 252-253.
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Table 8. China, Compensation of Urban Manufacturing Workers, Yangtze Delta Provinces and Guangdong, 2002 
Province Manufacturing Reported Reported Per month, Per hour,
employees in 2002 labor annual labor from reported annual from reported annual
urban units compensation compensation labor compensation labor compensation
(millions) (yuan) US $ PPP US $ yuan US $ PPP US $ yuan US $ PPP US $
Shanghai
1.31 21,957 $2,645 PPP$ 12,301 1,830 $220 PPP$ 1,025 9.34 $ 1.13 PPP$ 5.23municipality
Zhejiang
0.99 13,435 $1,619 PPP$ 7,527 1,120 $135 PPP$ 627 5.27 $ 0.69 PPP$ 3.20province
Jiangsu
2.27 11,731 $1,413 PPP$ 6,572 978 $118 PPP$ 548 4.99 $ 0.60 PPP$ 2.80province
Guangdong
2.55 14,958 $1,802 PPP$ 8,380 1,247 $150 PPP$ 698 6.37 $ 0.77 PPP$ 3.57province
Labor compensation below is adjusted for social insurance and housing fund payments by companies to city governments and for other labor costs:
Province Manufacturing Adjusted Adjusted Adjusted Adjusted
employees in 2002 labor annual labor monthly labor Hourly labor
urban units compensation compensation compensation compensation
(millions) (yuan) US $ PPP US $ yuan US $ PPP US $ yuan US $ PPP US $
Shanghai
1.31
28,983 -
34,692
$ 3,500 -
$ 4,190
PPP$ 16,277 -
19,483
2,415 -
2,891
$ 292 -
$ 349
PPP$ 1,356 -
1,624
14.83 -
17.75
$ 1.79 -
$ 2.14
PPP$ 8.33 -
9.97municipality
Zhejiang
0.99
17,734 -
21,227
$ 2,142 -
$ 2,564
PPP$ 9,959 -
11,921
1,478 -
1,769
$ 178 -
$ 214
PPP$ 830 -
993
9.07 -
10.86
$ 1.10 -
$ 1.31
PPP$ 5.09 -
6.10province
Jiangsu
2.27
15,485 -
18,535
$ 1,870 -
$ 2,239
PPP$ 8,696 -
10,409
1,290 -
1,545
$ 156 -
$ 187
PPP$ 725 -
867
7.92 -
9.48
$ 0.96 -
$ 1.15
PPP$ 4.45 -
5.32province
Guangdong
2.55
19,745 -
23,634
$ 2,385 -
$ 2,854
PPP$ 11,088 -
13,273
1,645 -
1,969
$ 199 -
$ 238
PPP$ 924 -
1,106
10.10 -
12.09
$ 1.22 -
$ 1.46
PPP$ 5.67 -
6.79province
Notes: Prepared by Judith Banister. Hourly wage estimates were calculated assuming 1,955 hours worked per year by the average employee.
           The average annual labor compensation data refer to employees of urban manufacturing units in 2002.
Sources: China NBS & Labour, 2003, p. 179; World Bank, 2003, p. 252.
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Table 9. China, TVE Industry Labor Compensation, Yangtze Delta Provinces and Guangdong, 2002 
Province Midyear 2002 Total 2002 2002 labor Adjusted Adjusted Adjusted
TVE industry TVE industry compensation annual monthly hourly
(gongye) labor per TVE industry labor labor labor
employees compensation employee compensation compensation compensation
(millions) (billion yuan) (yuan) US $ PPP US $ yuan US $ PPP US $ yuan US $ PPP US $
Shanghai
1.62
19.37 - 11,939 - 1,442 - 6,705 - 995 - 120 - 559 - 5.97 - 0.72 - 3.35 -
municipality 22.47 13,849 1,673 7,778 1,154 139 648 6.92 0.84 3.89
Zhejiang
8.66
88.20 - 10,188 - 1,230 - 5,722 - 849 - 103 - 477 - 5.09 - 0.62 - 2.86 -
province 102.31 11,819 1,427 6,637 985 119 553 5.91 0.71 3.32
Jiangsu
7.53
61.34 - 8,143 - 983 - 4,573 - 679 - 82 - 381 - 4.07 - 0.49 - 2.29 -
province 71.16 9,445 1,141 5,304 787 95 442 4.72 0.57 2.65
Guangdong
8.23
68.71 - 8,345 - 1,008 - 4,687 - 695 - 84 - 391 - 4.17 - 0.50 - 2.34 -
province 79.71 9,681 1,169 5,437 807 97 453 4.84 0.58 2.72
Notes: Prepared by Judith Banister. Reported total labor compensation is multiplied by 1.00 - 1.16 to derive a range for estimated actual labor 
             compensation. Non-city manufacturing workers are assumed to perform 2000 hours of actual work time per year. 
Sources: China Village and Town Enterprise Yearbook 2003, pp. 156, 174; World Bank, 2003, p. 252.
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Table 10. China, Best Guess Estimates of China Manufacturing Labor Compensation in Dollars, 2002
(At prevailing commercial exchange rate, and in international PPP dollars)
Category of Average  Average 2002 Total labor Annual Annual Monthly Monthly Monthly Hourly Hourly Hourly
Manufacturing number of "earnings" or compensation compensation compensation compensation compensation compensation compensation compensation compensation
workers  employees "wages" per per employee per employee per employee per employee per employee per employee per employee per employee per employee
in 2002 employee 2002 US dollars PPP dollars in yuan US dollars PPP dollars in yuan US dollars PPP dollars
Manufacturing 29.98 11,152 17,152 $2,071 9,632 1,429 $173 803 8.77 $1.06 4.93
"urban units" million yuan yuan PPP dollars yuan PPP dollars yuan PPP dollars
      Of which:
           On-post urban 29.26 11,001 16,920 $2,043 9,502 1,410 $170 792 8.65 $1.05 4.86
           manufacturing million yuan yuan PPP dollars yuan PPP dollars yuan PPP dollars
           staff & workers
         "Other" urban 0.72 17,237 26,511 $3,202 14,888 2,209 $267 1,241 13.56 $1.64 7.62
          manufacturing million yuan yuan PPP dollars yuan PPP dollars yuan PPP dollars
       employment
Manufacturing
village & town 70.62 6,927 7,481 $904 4,201 623 $75 350 3.74 $0.45 2.10
enterprises (TVEs) million yuan yuan PPP dollars yuan PPP dollars yuan PPP dollars
      Of which:
      Large-scale 18.98 8,899 9,611 $1,161 5,397 801 $97 450 4.81 $0.58 2.70
         manufacturing million yuan yuan PPP dollars yuan PPP dollars yuan PPP dollars
        TVEs
All China 100.61 8,186 10,363 $1,252 5,820 864 $104 485 5.24 $0.63 2.94
manufacturing million yuan yuan PPP dollars yuan PPP dollars yuan PPP dollars
urban units + TVEs
     Notes: Prepared by Judith Banister. First columns are from Table 5. Total labor compensation for urban workers is 1.538 times the wage, and for TVE workers is 1.08
     times the wage. Commercial exchange rate is 8.28 yuan = US$ 1. To calculate international Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) dollars, multiply dollars at commercial exchange
     rate by 4.65. Hourly compensation is calculated assuming that urban manufacturing employees perform 1,955 actual hours of work per year, and TVE workers 2,000 hours per
     year. See text for detail.
     Sources: Tables 5 & 7; China NBS & Labour, 2003,  pp. 29, 34, 46, 169, 171, 179, 230, 249, 473; China Village and Town Enterprise Yearbook 2003,  pp. 130-131; World
     Bank, 2003, pp. 252-253.
74
Table 11. China, Indices of Average Real Wages of Urban Manufacturing Staff and Workers, 1979-2002
(Preceding year = 100)
Year Urban total Of which:
manufacturing Urban Urban collective- Other urban
staff & workers state-owned units owned units ownership units
1979 109.1 107.4 104.4
1980 105.4 105.2 107.5
1985 104.1 103.4 106.9 117.9
1986 107.1 108.6 104.3 107.5
1987 102.2 102.6 100.8 107.6
1988 99.9 100.5 97.5 114.0
1989 95.5 95.6 94.3 100.9
1990 107.7 108.6 105.2 104.4
1991 105.1 104.1 105.4 112.9
1992 106.0 106.2 103.3 105.5
1993 109.4 106.2 105.4 101.1
1994 102.3 101.2 99.7 100.1
1995 103.3 101.6 103.5 101.8
1996 100.3 99.6 99.1 100.8
1997 102.0 100.5 99.7 102.3
1998 105.1 102.3 102.4 98.2
1999 111.8 110.5 107.6 110.3
2000 111.4 111.5 106.6 108.5
2001 110.9 111.3 105.7 107.9
2002 113.7 114.6 112.0 109.7
  
    Source: China NBS & Labour, 2003, pp. 36, 39, 42, 45.
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Table 12.  China, Average Annual Real Wages of Urban Manufacturing Staff and Workers, 1990-2002
                          (In constant 2002 yuan and constant 2002 dollars)
Urban total manufacturing
staff & workers,
real wages
Of which
Urban state-owned units,
real wages
Urban collective-owned units,
real wages
Other urban ownership units,
real wagesYear
In 2002
yuan
In 2002
US dollars
In 2002
PPP dollars
In 2002
yuan
In 2002
US dollars
In 2002
PPP dollars
In 2002
yuan
In 2002
US dollars
In 2002
PPP dollars
In 2002
yuan
In 2002
US dollars
In 2002
PPP dollars
1990 5,058 611 2,841 5,599 676 3,144 4,149 501 2,330 6,833 825 3,837
1991 5,316 642 2,986 5,828 704 3,273 4,373 528 2,456 7,714 932 4,332
1992 5,635 681 3,165 6,189 748 3,476 4,517 546 2,537 8,138 983 4,571
1993 6,165 745 3,462 6,573 794 3,691 4,761 575 2,674 8,228 994 4,621
1994 6,307 762 3,542 6,652 803 3,736 4,746 573 2,666 8,236 995 4,625
1995 6,515 787 3,659 6,759 816 3,796 4,913 593 2,759 8,384 1,013 4,709
1996 6,534 789 3,670 6,731 813 3,780 4,868 588 2,734 8,452 1,021 4,746
1997 6,665 805 3,743 6,765 817 3,799 4,854 586 2,726 8,646 1,044 4,856
1998 7,005 846 3,934 6,921 836 3,887 4,970 600 2,791 8,490 1,025 4,768
1999 7,832 946 4,398 7,647 924 4,295 5,348 646 3,003 9,365 1,131 5,259
2000 8,724 1,054 4,900 8,527 1,030 4,789 5,701 689 3,202 10,161 1,227 5,706
2001 9,675 1,169 5,434 9,490 1,146 5,330 6,026 728 3,384 10,964 1,324 6,157
2002 11,001 1,329 6,178 10,876 1,314 6,108 6,749 815 3,790 12,027 1,453 6,754
Notes: Prepared by Judith Banister.
           This table includes only the reported annual wage, which has not been adjusted to include other labor compensation costs such as required
           employer payments to municipal social insurance systems.
Sources: Table 11; China NBS & Labour, 2003, pp. 34-45.
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Source: Table 12.
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Figure 4.  China, Average Real Wages of Urban Manufacturing Staff and Workers, 1990-2002
(In constant 2002 yuan)
Glossary and Definitions 
 
Actual situation that year ─ ben nian shiji 
本年实际 
 
Average earnings ─ pingjun laodong baochou 
                 平均劳动报酬 
 
Average number of employees ─ pingjun jiuye renshu 
平均就业人数 
 
China labor force market wage survey –  
Zhongguo laodongli shichang gongzi diaocha  
中国劳动力市场工资调查 
This survey was conducted by the Ministry of Labour and Social Security in 
2003 with reference to calendar year 2002 data.  The survey was carried out in 
51 large and medium-sized cities and surveyed 11,704 enterprises, 37% of 
which were manufacturing enterprises.  Staff and workers of all the surveyed 
enterprises totaled 860,000, of which 48% were in manufacturing industries.  
 
Cities ─ chengshi or cheng 
         城市 or 城 
 
Compensation of employees or laborers remuneration ─  
                     laodongzhe baochou 
               劳动者报酬 
 
Compensation survey – see “China labor force market wage survey” 
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Currency, PRC ─ yuan, renminbi 
                 元，人民币 
 
Earnings or remuneration or compensation ─ laodong baochou 
劳动报酬 
 
Employed, employment – Means currently working and being paid for the work (even 
if promised pay is in arrears).  All these terms mean the same thing: 
 
jiuye            congye                 zaiye    
就业               从业                  在业 
 
 
Employed workers, employees – congye renyuan   jiuye renyuan 
从业人员      就业人员 
 
Employment in urban units ─ chengzhen danwei jiuye renyuan 
                          城镇单位就业人员 
 
Fuli feiyong or fuli fei – see “Welfare fund” 
 
Government ministries – see Ministries 
 
Hired laborers or hired hands ─ gugong renshu 
                           雇工人数 
 
 
Housing fund ─  a fund in which money is set aside for each worker by 
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name—money that the worker can use to help buy an apartment 
zhufang gong jijin 
住房公积金 
 
Hukou – see “Population residence registration” 
 
 
 
Individual and household enterprises ─ see also “Self-employed individual or family 
enterprises” and “Manufacturing economic organizations – urban” 
 
                                  getihu 
                             个体户 
Industry ─ gongye 
           工业 
 
Investors ─ touzizhe renshu 
           投资者人数 
 
Labor compensation, total labor compensation ─ laodongzhe baochou 
                                         劳动者报酬 
 
Labor situation ─ laodong qingkuang 
                劳动情况 
 
Laid-off staff and workers ─ xiagang zhigong 
                         下岗职工 
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Manufacturing economic organizations – urban 
 
Most manufacturing employees in cities are employed by workplaces and 
factories organized as work units (danwei); their employees totaled 30 million 
at yearend 2002.  These manufacturing work units may be state-owned 
enterprises, urban collectives, or private sector enterprises. 
 
Smaller in size than the work units are the “private enterprises” (siying qiye), 
which had a total of 5.64 million manufacturing investors and employees in 
China’s cities in 2002.  The definition of a siying qiye is that it is an 
economic organization that is privately owned and privately operated and has 
8 or more employees.  There are three types of siying qiye:  
 
 
duzi qiye – exclusive investment, solely owned by a single investor 
独资企业 
 
  hehuo qiye – partnership 
合伙企业 
 
youxian zeren qiye – limited liability enterprise that has 2-30 investors 
有限责任企业 
 
Smaller than the siying qiye are the individual and family-owned enterprises 
called getihu, which totaled 2.57 million manufacturing workers in China’s 
cities in 2002.  A getihu has fewer than 8 employees.    
 
Manufacturing employment in urban units ─  
chengzhen danwei zhizaoye jiuye renyuan 
城镇单位制造业就业人员 
See also “Manufacturing economic organizations – urban” 
 
Medical insurance fund ─ yiliao baoxian 
医疗保险 
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Migrant, migration, to migrate – yimin  移民 
        qianyi 迁移 
        qianxi 迁徙 
    yiju  [literally, to migrate and change residence] 
移居 
 
    qianju  [literally, change one’s dwelling place] 
迁居 
 
The above Chinese words for “migration” imply long-term or permanent 
migration involving a move and a permanent change of residence and perhaps, 
in the Chinese case, a change of hukou or permanent population residence 
registration. 
 
    liudong  [literally flowing, as with water] 
流动 
The term liudong is used for population or worker movement when the moves 
are not expected to be permanent or policy dictates that the move will not be 
permanent. 
 
Migrant workers – liudong laogong     
流动劳工 
[literally, flowing or floating workers] 
 
Ministries involved in the collection and reporting of statistics on manufacturing 
employment and labor compensation in China: 
 
 China National Bureau of Statistics- 
Zhonghua renmin gongheguo guojia tongjiju 
中华人民共和国国家统计局 
Responsible for overseeing all statistics gathering in China. 
 
 China Ministry of Labour and Social Security- 
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Zhongguo laodong he shehui baozhangbu 
中国劳动和社会保障部 
Responsible for gathering and reporting statistics on city work units and 
their employment and wages, city social insurance funds, workers 
laid-off from city work units, and unemployment and re-employment in 
cities.  
 
China Ministry of Agriculture - 
Zhongguo nongyebu 
中国农业部 
Responsible for gathering and reporting statistics on employment and 
labor compensation in China’s towns and rural areas.  
 
China State Administration for Industry and Commerce – 
Zhonghua renmin gongheguo guojia gongshang xingzheng guanli zongju 
中华人民共和国国家工商行政管理总局 
Responsible for gathering and reporting statistics on self-employed 
workers, small family-owned businesses, and small privately owned and 
privately operated enterprises outside of agriculture.    
 
Not-on-post staff and workers ─ bu zaigang zhigong 
                            不在岗职工 
 
Off-post staff and workers ─ see “not-on-post staff and workers” 
“laid-off staff and workers” 
 
Old-age pension fund, pension insurance ─ yanglao baoxian 
养老保险 
On-post staff and workers ─ zai gang zhigong 
                         在岗职工 
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On-post staff and workers, as distinct from laid-off (off-post, not-on-post) staff and 
workers, as distinct from unemployed workers: 
 
These categories refer to workers in cities and not to workers in rural areas or 
towns.  “On-post staff and workers” includes those adults in the legal 
working ages who are currently employed in urban work units (danwei) and 
who are being paid, or at least are supposed to be paid (though wage payments 
may be in arrears).  “Laid-off” (or off-post or not-on-post) staff and workers 
are those employees in the working ages who have been formally laid off by 
their work units, but who still keep a formal tie with the former work unit, 
often for some of the following reasons:  to keep their subsidized housing, for 
medical benefits, to keep other subsidies or benefits, so they can get a 
subsistence allowance, to get retraining and job-search assistance, or so that 
they will be called back if the work load of the enterprise picks up.  
“Unemployed” workers are those adults in cities who are listed as “urban 
registered unemployed” (see “unemployment rate”).       
 
 
Pearl River Delta (in Guangdong province) ─  
zhujiang sanjiaozhou or zhusanjiao 
珠江三角洲         珠三角 
 
Population residence registration – hukou 
户口 
In practice, in China, it is difficult for someone born in a rural area or town to 
get permission to shift residence registration to a city.  A rural-to-urban 
migrant with rural hukou might live in a city for years or decades without ever 
being granted a city permanent residence registration.   
 
    Temporary residence permit – zan zhu zheng 
暂住证 
A migrant who moves to a city to work is supposed to register with local 
authorities and get a temporary residence permit. 
 
PPP ─ purchasing power parity, international purchasing power parity  
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A method used by the World Bank for comparing the real purchasing power 
of a national currency with the cost of the same “basket” of goods on the 
international market or in the United States. 
 
Privately owned and privately operated enterprises ─ siying qiye 
私营企业 
See also “Manufacturing economic organizations – urban” 
 
 
Retirement age workers who have been rehired or who have continued working              
-- pinyong, liuyong de li tuixiu renyuan 
    聘用，留用的离退休人员 
 
Rural ─ xiangcun   nongcun   See also “Urban and rural” 
        乡村     农村 
      
Self-employed individual or family enterprises ─  
        see also “Individual and household enterprises” 
geti jiuye 
个体就业 
 
Social insurance payments from the work unit ─  
danwei shehui baoxian fukuan 
单位社会保险付款 
 
Staff and workers ─ zhigong 
                  职工 
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Statistics ministries – see Ministries 
 
Temporary, provisional ─ linshi   临时 
 
A temporary or provisional worker in a city enterprise has worked at that 
enterprise for less than one year.   
 
Total wage ─ gongzi zong’e 
工资总额 
 
Total wage bill, wages and related income ─ gongzi ji gongzixing shouru 
工资及工资性收入 
Towns ─ zhen   镇 
 
TVEs ─ village and town enterprises 
         xiangzhen qiye 
         乡镇企业 
Often called “township and village enterprises,” the TVEs were originally 
established as collective economic units run by local governments in rural areas 
and towns.  The purpose of TVEs was and is to employ rural peasants outside 
of agriculture in industrial or service occupations, and in locations not far from 
their village family homes.  This allows modernization of China’s vast 
countryside without necessitating massive migration from the villages to cities.  
In the 1980s and especially the 1990s to today, TVEs shifted from public 
toward private ownership, and many foreign-funded enterprises became 
classified as TVEs.  Now the TVE category, in addition to including small 
local enterprises, can also include very large factories in industrial parks outside 
cities, as well as suburban, town, and rural factories. Companies have incentives 
to have their factories classified as TVEs, because required social insurance 
payments are very low, statistical reporting requirements are minimal, and there 
are many legal and taxation benefits.  
 
Unemployment insurance fund ─ shiye baoxian 
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失业保险 
 
Unemployment rate:    shiye lu   失业率 
 
The calculation of the unemployment rate in China is non-standard.  The rural 
unemployed are completely ignored in the calculation.  China’s 
unemployment rate is based on city data only and does not include the 
unemployed in towns that have been established as urban places.  The figure 
used in the numerator for calculating the unemployment rate is so-called “urban 
registered unemployment.” 
       chengzhen dengji shiye 城镇登记失业 
These are adults living in cities whose permanent population registration 
(hukou) is located in that city where they live, who are in the legal working 
ages of 16-59 for men and 16-54 for female white-collar workers and 16-49 
for female blue-collar workers, and who are formally registered as 
unemployed.  “Urban registered unemployment” does not include laid-off 
workers who are still associated in any formal way with their former work unit, 
and does not include workers who have been forced to retire early, and does 
not include in-migrants whose permanent population registration is outside 
that city. 
 
The denominator of the unemployment rate is the sum of employed workers in 
legal working ages whose permanent population registration is in the city where 
they live plus the urban registered unemployed.   
   
 
Urban ─ chengzhen       See also “Urban and rural” 
         城镇 
     
Urban and rural –         chengzhen  and    xiangcun   nongcun 
城镇     乡村    农村 
 
The terms “urban” and “rural” are defined differently in China depending on the 
source of statistics.  At all times, the city districts of cities are classified as 
urban, while villages are classified as rural.  The differences are in how towns 
are classified, and how suburban districts around cities are classified.   For 
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population and housing censuses, NBS defines cities, their suburban districts, 
and all towns that have been established as urban places as “urban,” while the 
rest of the country is called “rural.”  But in administrative data, other ministries 
use a narrow definition of “urban” that includes only city districts and perhaps 
some close peri-urban areas and maybe the town that serves as the 
administrative center of each county; the large residual is all designated “rural.”  
Statistical sources and publications usually use the terms “urban” and “rural” 
without ever defining them, so users have to infer what definitions are being 
used in that statistics volume, and sometimes even for each individual table in a 
volume of statistics.  
 
 
Urban manufacturing staff and workers ─  
chengzhen zhizaoye zhigong 
城镇制造业职工 
 
Wages ─ gongzi 
         工资 
 
Welfare fund ─ fuli feiyong or fuli fei 
福利费用  or 福利费 
The fuli fei is a fund that is supposed to be set up and used by enterprises to 
benefit employees.  The fund can pay costs of a common worker space for 
leisure use, such as a gym, or where employees can buy foods and other 
needed items.  Expenses of a labor union or of labor representatives could be 
covered by the welfare fund.  This fund also pays for employees to go visit 
their parents or spouse if these close relatives live in a different place.  The 
fund covers funeral expenses if an employee dies.  The fuli fei also gives 
money to employees in financial difficulty due to big medical expenses, and 
may be used to give subsistence payments to laid-off workers or those on 
long-term leave for health reasons or to the spouse of a deceased employee.  
The welfare fund can also pay medical expenses for retirees.  It can be used 
to pay monthly subsidies to couples with one child who have signed the 
one-child certificate agreeing to have only one child.  A typical use for the 
fuli fei fund is to pay for outings, parties, ceremonies, or gifts to all employees.  
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The fund may also be used to help purchase, maintain, and repair worker 
dormitory housing.  The fund can also pay for special food subsidies.  Even 
though, in theory, some of these expenses are supposed to be reported as part 
of the wage, employers and employees generally prefer not to include them as 
wage, but rather to pay for them from the welfare fund.   
 
Workers’ compensation fund ─ gongshang baoxian 
                           工伤保险 
 
Workers whose population registration is in rural areas ─  
hukou zai nongcun de renyuan 
户口在农村的人员 
 
Workforce, workers, employed workers ─ congye renyuan 
从业人员 
See also “Employed, employment” and “Employed workers, employees” 
 
Yangtze River ─ changjiang 
长江 
 
Yangtze River Delta ─ changjiang sanjiaozhou or changsanjiao 
长江三角洲         or  长三角 
 
Yearend number of workers ─ nianmo renshu 
年末人数 
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